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Not all militaries are able to learn counterinsurgency. Whether a military has the capacity to do 
so is determined by very specific factors: a conducive political environment; and pragmatism 
within the respective military. During the 1970s and 1980s, the South African military exhibited 
both and learned counterinsurgency to devastating effect. Post 1990, however, the political 
environment has proven unfavourable for the continuing of that learning by the new South 
African National Defence Force, and the military no longer practises counterinsurgency to any 
significant extent. However, problematically, new commitments in peace support operations, in 
otherwise insurgent conflicts, are giving rise to a need for many of the counterinsurgency skills 
and tactics discarded during the transition period. 
This dissertation examines the learning of counterinsurgency by the South African military during 
Apartheid, and discusses what has become of that knowledge during the transition to 
democracy. It is divided into four chapters. The first chapter considers the learning of 
counterinsurgency by military institutions in general; the second chapter, the learning of 
counterinsurgency by the South African military; and the third considers the continuing of 
counterinsurgency by the military after the transition. The fourth chapter, reflects on the 
importance of learning counterinsurgency, and examines in greater depth the military's 
reluctance to continue to learn counterinsurgency. 
In this, the paper concludes that given new security commitments, it is highly problematic for the 
military to continue to not practise counterinsurgency. That in order for the military to achieve its 
new strategic objectives and tasks, and the nation its national security goals, the South African 










"They would believe that rebellion was absolute like war, and deal with it on the analogy 
of war ... war upon rebellion was messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife." 
T. E. Lawrence 
Seven Pillars of Wisdom 
" ... they must not attempt to crack the nut, they must only gnaw on the surface and 
the borders." 
Carl von Clausewitz 
On War 
"The war wi" be a tedious one, nor can it be glorious, even tho' attended with success. 
Instead of decisive battles, woodland skirmishes - instead of Colours and Cannons, our 
Trophies wi" be stinking scalps." 
William Smith as quoted by Francis Parkman 
The Conspiracy of Pontiac 
"juggernaut n. 1. large heavy lorry. 2. any irresistible destructive force." 
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Counterinsurgency is notoriously difficult, with many comparing it to both that of an art 
and a science. Success often proves illusive. A definitive theory and approach, similarly 
SO.1 However, some militaries fair better than others. A reason for which is a military's 
capacity to learn and keep COIN knowledge 2 While many militaries have encounters 
with insurgency, most struggle to learn COIN, let alone preserve that knowledge for the 
future. Others, however, do learn and learn well. For these few, the question becomes 
what they do with that knowledge. The SANDF is one such military. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to consider the learning of COIN by the SA military, 
and what has become of that knowledge after the transition to democracy. To what 
extent the military has maintained its COIN knowledge gained during the 1970s and 
1980s, how it now prepares for COIN, and particularly so given the military's increasing 
deployments into insurgent conflicts in PSOs. 
(i) Learning & Keeping COIN 
COIN is the action taken by a government to counter, undermine and eliminate an 
insurgency. Learning COIN is a difficult task, and success is dependent on fairly 
specific factors. These factors include a conducive political environment and 
pragmatism within the military. Historically, a favourable political environment consists 
of a crisis of legitimacy within a colonial or minority-ruled government, and where this 
crisis is articulated in terms of insurgency. Pragmatism centres on the reliance of a 
military on practice over theory in its approach to COIN. This reliance is rooted in 
knowledge gained through formative COIN experiences; decentralized structures; a 
limited access to resources; and a culture which values adaptability. Importantly, these 
factors cannot be simulated, and militaries which have been fortunate enough to 
acquire COIN knowledge, should keep that knowledge. 
The keeping of COIN knowledge is achieved through theory or doctrine, training 
programmes and elite units which specialize in COIN warfare. In an era defined by 
insurgency, militaries are empowered by being well-versed in COIN. Continuing to 
learn COIN entrenches features within a military required by contemporary conflict. 
Namely, flexibility, adaptability and innovativeness. A military able to conduct COIN is a 
1 Annette Seegers. "lfOnly ... The Ongoing Search for Method in Counter-Insurgency." Journal of" 
Contemporary A/dean Studies 8/9 (19891 I 990): 203-224. 
2 That is. their ability to learn valuable COIN knowledge. incorporate and adapt their experience in the 
development of doctrine. tactical skill and capabilities. and training for future encounters. David A. 
Charters. "From Palestine to Northern Ireland: British Adaptation to Low-Intensity Operations." in 
Armies in Lmt'-fntensi(r Conflict. A Comparative Ana~rsis. eds. David Charters and Maurice Tugwell 











military able to be effective in a variety of contemporary roles, albeit fighting insurgency 
or participating in PSOs in insurgent conflicts. 
(ii) The SA Military & COIN 
South Africa has arguably one of the most infamous COIN histories. Apartheid leaders 
waged a devastating COIN campaign during the 1970s and 1980s, against several 
liberation movements, internally and externally, in a rural and urban context. The SADF 
played a leading role in this campaign, and gained extensive COIN knowledge and 
experience. Various security forces participated in COIN, however, the military was 
decisive in shaping South Africa's overall COIN posture. 
Exhibiting the factors necessary for acquiring COIN knowledge, the SADF learned 
COIN during this period. A crisis of legitimacy emerged from 1960 against Apartheid's 
white-minority rule. Articulated through insurgency, the crisis came to be seen as a 
total onslaught by Apartheid leaders. In response, the military took a pragmatic 
approach. While theory was developed, a greater emphasis was placed on practice. 
This sense of practice was rooted in the SADF's formative experiences; its reliance on 
decentralized elite forces and commando structures; and its having to operate with 
limited resources, especially human resources. The lack of manpower resulted in the 
SADF making use of allied and proxy forces to fight the insurgencies both within and 
beyond South Africa's borders. This approach was further indicative of an institutional 
culture open to adaptability and flexibility. 
Post 1994, the transition has proven to be a precarious environment for the continuing 
of COIN. The SANDF was born out of the negotiations for a democratic South Africa, 
and took a staunchly conventional stance in terms of posture, function and design. In 
light of the overwhelming illegitimacy of the SADF's COIN wars, COIN was relegated to 
the past and is considered a method of warfare no longer relevant to the military. 
However, new security interests and threats have resulted in the SANDF becoming 
increasingly involved in PSOs in insurgent conflicts. These operations have given rise 
to needs within the army classically met through COIN training. Yet, pragmatism within 
the SANDF has been ambiguous. The SANDF continues to struggle with a lack of 
resources, and several specialist structures continue to practice COIN. However, these 
structures are on the decline, and the vast majority of members of the army are no 











While the needs arising in PSOs and the necessity to meet security policy goals are 
creating an impetus to refer back to COIN, the future of the military's COIN knowledge 
remains unclear. The SANDF appears to have lost its pragmatic edge in a political 
environment essentially still hostile to COIN. Wider policy goals are clear on the need 
to create greater security and stability in the region. However, the fear of the military 
becoming the juggernaut it once was, is hindering the development of a conducive 
political environment to continue COIN within the SANDF. 
As such, the keeping of COIN knowledge by the SANDF is in doubt, and COIN as a 
method of warfare known to the SA military in jeopardy. COIN is to playa central role in 
the SANDF's future if the military is to aid in attaining current security policy goals and 
meet its own operational needs. However, should the SANDF continue on its present 
course, COIN knowledge will be lost forever. 
(iii) Method & Outline 
The dissertation will be divided into four chapters: the analytical framework; the 
learning of COIN by the SADF; the keeping of that knowledge by the SANDF; and a 
final chapter which will consider the case in perspective. 
Chapter One will provide a definition of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and a 
review of the necessary factors for learning and keeping COIN knowledge. Chapter 
Two will examine the learning of COIN by the SADF between 1975 and the transition, 
and Chapter Three will consider the learning and keeping of that knowledge by the 
SANDF after 1990. Finally, Chapter Four will reflect on the importance of learning and 
continuing COIN, and the SANDF's reluctance towards COIN. 
The thesis takes the form of a conceptual, descriptive case study regarding the 
learning and keeping of COIN knowledge. Specifically, the analytical framework 
identifies the factors affecting the learning of COIN, and is illustrated with the case of 
the SA military. The case was selected due to the military's extensive, multiple 
experiences with COIN, and its recent institutional transition. The single case method 
likewise allows for a more in-depth analysis and evaluation of both the case and the 
concepts presented. 
Evidence was collected through a variety of sources. Conceptual information was 
gathered from secondary sources, and case evidence was collected through both 
secondary and primary resources. Primary resources included legal and military policy 











with military personnel and civilian analysts. These interviews were carried out through 
a fairly loosely structured, in-depth approach centred around a number of open-ended 
and key questions. A number of interviews were conducted face-to-face, however, 
several were telephonic interviews. Also, written and email correspondence was used 
with the DOD and selected civilian analysts. Importantly, the nature of the subject is 
one that is largely classified. As such, the paper has relied predominantly on 
unclassified materials and information provided by military and civilian sources. 
However, on occasion sources have been left anonymous due to requests based on a 
need for confidentiality as a result of the sensitive nature of the topic. 
Moreover, in terms of learning, this thesis is considering a military institution, and 
specifically a military institution's learning of COIN. Consequently, it will focus 
specifically on learning relating to COIN. As mentioned above, various security 
institutions were significantly engaged in COIN during the 1970s and 1980s, however, 
the dissertation will only consider that of the military. Within this, the thesis will only 
consider and refer to the SA Army and the DMI due to their overwhelming prominence 
in COIN and contemporary peace operations. 
Finally, whether practised by democracies or authoritarian regimes, COIN has a 
tendency to be an innately dirty game, characterized by terror, torture, disappearances, 
detention without trial, and covert operations. However, with regards to the SADF, it is 
not the purpose of this dissertation to evaluate the SADF's COIN from a moral position, 
but rather to describe and analyze their learning of COIN. The emphasis is on 
establishing the facts regarding this learning, and what of that knowledge remains. 
Importantly, this dissertation is not considering the transformation of the military. While 
the paper will briefly discuss the transition as experienced by the military, the paper will 











CHAPTER ONE: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Learning COIN is a difficult task for which not all militaries have the capacity. As such, 
COIN knowledge is invaluable. This chapter will define insurgency and COIN, and 
consider the factors which lead to a military learning COIN. Broadly, these factors 
include a conducive political environment and pragmatism. The chapter will likewise 
note how a military keeps this knowledge. 
1.1. KEY CONCEPTS 
Insurgency is a form of unconventional warfare, and will be understood to include both 
rural guerrilla action and urban uprising and rebellion. COIN is the method of fighting 
used to put down insurgency, and is understood in terms of theory and practice. 
1.1.1. Insurgency 
Insurgency is a much debated concept. It is best understood broadly as a term used to 
describe" ... an attempt to overthrow or oppose a state or regime by force of arms ... ,,3 It 
can be characterized by rural guerrilla action and or urban uprising and rebellion. 
Insurgency is an unconventional method of warfare. Conventional war involves the 
reliance on a central command structure, technology and the use of heavy firepower, 
and aims to gain control of territory and resources. Unconventional war is the antithesis 
of this. It is protracted and becomes a war of attrition; uses small, lightly armed, mobile 
units; and aims to control the loyalties of people.4 It makes use of irregular tactics: hit-
and-run attacks, sabotage and terror. It avoids the enemy's main forces, and attacks 
from unexpected directions at unexpected times. 5 Its use became known as guerrilla 
war during the early 19th century, meaning little war.6 However, it has endured 
throughout history, defining wars without clear beginnings and ends, of peoples of pre-
states, weak states and failed states. It " ... is a highly political act, arising from some 
grievance or upon the exploitation and manipulation of grievance.,,7 Practitioners 
likewise vary, including those from the extreme left to the extreme right, nationalists, 
monarchists, separatists and fundamentalists. 
3 Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion. The History and Politics o/Counterinsurgency (Kentucky: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 1. 
4 Insurgency relies heavily on popular support. For example, Lawrence argued for only needing 2% active 
support from the population, with the rest required merely to be quietly sympathetic. T. E. Lawrence, 
Seven Pillars o/Wisdom (Hertfordshire: Wordsworths Editions Limited, 1997. First published 1935),186. 
5 Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies. Guerrillas and their Opponents 
since 1750 (London: Routledge, 2001), vii; John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons/rom Malaya and 
Vietnam. Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), IS. 
6 Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott, Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency (London and 
Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd, 1985), 1; Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies. Guerrillas 
and their Opponents since 1750, 1. 











Insurgency is the weapon of the weak. s Weak local forces participate in an asymmetric 
conflict against an enemy who possesses superior conventional capability in terms of 
numbers, resources and equipment. The enemy constitutes a national or colonial 
government, or an occupying force. 9 This asymmetry has historically existed between 
the enemy and a specific insurgent group. However, more recently, multiple groups 
operating independently, even against each other, are likewise prominent. Importantly, 
the insurgents do not have to win, they just have to outlast the enemy, wear down their 
will to continue fighting, rendering the insurgents victorious by not having lost rather 
than by winning outright. 10 In insurgency, it is the most committed who wins. 
Insurgency can be located in both rural and urban contexts. Historically, the former 
proved more successful due to insurgents having local support, knowledge of the 
terrain, greater mobility to carry out attacks, evade capture, and establish base areas 
from which to wage the insurgency. Urban insurgency has been more easily contained. 
However, with greater urbanization, this vulnerability has arguably diminished, and 
particularly when insurgency is waged as a combination of rural and urban action. 11 
Notably, there have been various proponents of insurgent warfare through the ages. 
During the 20 th century, insurgency was adopted by communist revolutionaries who 
theorized regarding rural guerrilla action and its later application to the urban arena. Of 
note was Guevara's fa co concept and Mao's organized model of rural guerrilla warfare, 
both of which inspired many in anti-colonial struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Mao, for example, advocated a phased, protracted method for revolution: first covert 
action and political preparation; then hit-and-run tactics and terror; followed by more 
overt, mobile actions, and finally, conventional warfare. 12 However, despite the relative 
success of these theories, there never emerged an approach to fit all circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the use of insurgent tactics persists. Two prominent contemporary 
applications include jihad and warlord insurgency.13 In the case of the latter, insurgency 
8 Anthony James Joes. A10dern Guerrilla Insurgent)' (Westport Connecticut: Praeger Publishers. 1992). 
5. 
9 Andrew Mack. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: the Politics of Asymmetric Contlict." iVorld 
Politics 27 (1975): 175. 178 and 181-182. 
10 Joes. Resisting Rehellion. The History and Politics olCounterinsurgel1lT. 10-11: Mack. 200. 11 " 
Beckett. "The Future oflnsurgency," 24 and 31-32. 
12 See Che Guevara. "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method," (first published 1963). in Guerrilla War/are. by Che 
Guevara. (London: Souvenir Press. 2003). 142-158: Mao Tse-Tung. On Guerrilla War/clre. trans. Samuel 
~. Griffith II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2000. first published 1961).94-114. 
I.. For Jihad insurgency. see Mahmood Mamdani. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim. America, the Cold War, 
and the Roots 01 Terror (New York: Pantheon Books. 2004). 174-175: Bernard Lewis. What Went 











has returned to a method of fighting to achieve power in weak and failed states. 
Political aims are of a raw, classic nature, and should not be misidentified as criminal. It 
came to prominence towards the end of the Cold War. 14 As superpower aid was 
withdrawn, so leaders of various weak states began to lose their grip over the territories 
they had governed through colonial-styled, indirect rule. Rebel militias emerged from 
outlying regions where governments had long since been represented. Supported by 
funds and guns secured through illegal trades, these militia fight remaining government 
forces and then each other as the state fails. While control of the state is desirable, it is 
not essential, and some have been satisfied with controlling territories in which they 
establish their own forms of rudimentary rule. 15 Examples include, Somalia, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, the DRe and Afghanistan. 
Therefore, insurgency is enduring, and is used to refer to an armed means by which to 
overthrow a ruling regime. It includes both rural and urban guerrilla action, by varied 
participants who fight in an asymmetric conflict against a superior military force. 
1.1.2. Counterinsurgency 
Counterinsurgency is exactly that, actions taken by government forces to counter and 
eliminate insurgency. However, from the Romans to the present day, COIN poses a 
formidable task to any military, no matter how well trained, disciplined and supplied. 
COIN requires conventional militaries to fight an unconventional war. Designed for 
traditional battlefields and maximum force, conventional forces are required to apply 
minimum force with surgical care in populous environments. 16 Conventional tactics, 
troops and weapons, however superior, do not guarantee victory. 17 The COIN force is 
perpetually reacting, the initiative forever in the hands of the insurgents. There is no 
distinguishable enemy and no clear end. As goals fail to be realized, professionalism 
suffers and COIN disintegrates into a very dirty game, often characterized by the likes 
"Terrorism and Politics in Iran." in Terrorism in Context. ed. Martha Crenshaw (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press. 1995); Stephen Kinzer. All the Shah's A/en. An American Coup and 
the Roots oj'Middle East Terror (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. Inc .. 2003). 
14 See Christopher Clapham. African Guerrillas (Oxford: James Currey Ltd .. 1998): Christopher 
Clapham. Aji"ica and the International System. The Politics oj'State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1996): William Reno. Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder. CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 1999): Stathis N. Kalyvas. "'New' and -Old' Civil Wars. A Valid Distinction:" 
IYorld Politics S4 (October 2001): 99-118. 
15 These fiefdoms largely coincide with natural resource deposits and trading networks. all of which 
ensure an indefinite source of funds, and a lack of incentive for formal state-building. Clapham. African 
Guerrillas. S. 
16 Alistair Finlan. "Warfare by Other Means: Special Forces. Terrorism and Grand Strategy," Small Wars 
and Insurgencies 14 (Spring 2003): 94. 











of torture, summary execution and detention without trial. COIN is thus considered to 
be " ... distinctly unglamorous.,,18 
COIN is understood in terms of theory and practice. Practice considers the practitioners 
and their methods. For example, special forces. Special forces constitute light, highly 
skilled, small units of elite forces trained in unconventional war, and which conduct 
covert and clandestine operations, including assassination, raids, reconnaissance, and 
sabotage. Theory pertains to doctrine, the ideas, concepts, informing principles and 
guidelines for action by COIN practitioners. 
COIN theory has come to be divided between three basic approaches. WHAM is the 
most widely accepted, and constitutes a politically-orientated, indirect approach which 
prioritizes development over security. Emerging in the wake of the British campaign in 
Malaya, WHAM seeks to isolate the population from insurgent infiltration and 
propaganda, and to secure their allegiance by meeting their developmental needs. 19 
However, support for the insurgency often stems from just opposition, resulting in no 
amount of reform being sufficient. Problematically, this approach thus assumes that the 
government is fighting the good fight, and that the population is merely vulnerable to 
insurgent manipulation. Conversely, the cost-benefit approach is coercive, direct and 
military-focused, and involves the raising of costs to communities via repressive means 
to discourage support for the insurgency.2o Having emerged in America during the 
Vietnam War, it emphasizes security above all else. However, it is criticized for being 
too forceful, demoralizing for the COIN force, and to have a poor record of success. 21 
The third, imperial approach is less obvious in COIN theory, however, is the approach 
used by those most successful with COIN. From the Romans to the later colonial 
powers, it involves the COIN force creating enemies for its enemies, using opponents 
of the insurgents to fight the insurgents, creating insurgency to counter insurgency. 
18 Beckett. Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies. Guerrillas and their Opponents since I 75(}, 
25. 
19 D. Michael Shafer. ''The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency." Political Science QuarterZl' 103 
(Spring 1988): 62:Nagl. Counterinsurgency Lessonsfroll1 Malaya and /·ietnam. Learning to Eat Soup 
It'ith A Knife. 27. See Robert Thompson. Defeating Communist Insurgency. Experiencesfi'om Malaya 
and /'ietnam (London: Chatto & Windus, 1974. first published 1966): T. N. Greene, The Guerrilla and 
HOlt' to Fight Him (New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger. 1962): Frank Kitson, LOll' Intensity 
Ooeration: Subl'ersion. Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber & Faber. 1971). 
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Shafer. 73. 
21 The British Army's COIN manual states that it clouds political realities and leads to a military 
dominated campaign plan ..... 'that misses the real focus of an insurgency ... is conceptually flawed and 
will not achieve success.'" British Army Code No71596 (Part 2). Army Field Manual. Volume V. 
Operations Other Than War. Section B, Counter Insurgency Operations. Part 2. The Conduct oj'Counter 
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Historically used on the borders of states and empires, this approach allows for the 
divide and rule of enemies. Opponents include both local auxiliary armies and already 
existing forces (often enemies of the insurgents). Importantly, this approach is used 
opportunistically as candidate forces present themselves, and out of necessity to meet 
force requirements. 22 
Thus, COIN is the action taken by a governing power against insurgency. It is 
inherently difficult, and is understood in terms of theory and practice. Much like 
insurgency, attempts to universalize theory have failed, with many theories being 
bound to time and place 23 
1.1.3. Conclusion 
Insurgency is a broad term referring to the use of unconventional warfare in an 
asymmetric conflict with a conventional force. It manifests as guerrilla action, uprising 
and rebellion, in rural and urban settings. It is enduring both as a method of fighting 
and as a bloody conundrum for those who try to fight back. Faced with insurgency, 
conventional militaries are required to fight unconventionally. However, there exists no 
definitive theory as to how. 
1.2. LEARNING COIN & MILITARY INSTITUTIONS 
Acquiring COIN knowledge is determined by a conducive political environment for the 
learning of COIN by a military, and pragmatism within that military. Once acquired, 
COIN survives through doctrine, training and elites. 
1.2.1. Learning COIN 
Learning involves adapting established knowledge to new circumstances, and 
developing new ideas and methods while guided by prior experiences. 24 A military's 
institutional capacity for learning COIN depends on a conducive political environment 
which favours the learning of COIN by the military, and pragmatism within that military. 
Pragmatism refers to the emphasis a military places on practice over theory: the more 
22 The Romans made use of foreign auxiliaries, local non-Romans who were recruited as the empire 
expanded. They likewise made use of foreign mercenaries from the late 4th century. While the auxiliaries 
constituted foreign units led by imperial officers. the mercenary units amounted to barbarian federates' 
who served under their own leaders, and fought for Rome as federate allies. As Rome declined so the 
meeting of force requirements became difficult and increasingly necessitated such alliances. A more 
recent example includes the British use of loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. John Keegan. A 
History of IVar/are (London: Pimlico. 1994). 184-185.275 and 280: Peter Heather. The Fall of the 
Roman Empire (Basingstoke and Oxford: Macmillan. 2005). 191-250. 
2, Seegers. ··lfOnIy ... The Ongoing Search for Method in Counter-Insurgency." 209-214: Beckett and 
Pimlott. 8. 
24 Nag!. COllnterinslIrgen(,' Lessons/rom Malaya and '·ietnam. Learning to Eat SOIlP With A Kni/e. 6: 












emphasis placed on practice, the more effectively a military will learn. An emphasis on 
practice is rooted in a reliance on knowledge gained during previous encounters with 
COIN. This knowledge is acquired through a military's historical need to adapt as part 
of its formative experiences, and given its structure, access to resources, and culture. If 
a military is too rigid in its application of theory and or there is an unfavourable political 
environment, a military will struggle to learn. 
1.2.1.1. Political Environment 
A conducive political environment for learning COIN constitutes a crisis of legitimacy in 
which insurgency is waged in resistance to the standing political order, bringing into 
question its legitimacy to rule. This crisis has emerged in colonial, colonial-type or 
minority-ruled settings. 
In colonial struggles, the political remained supreme. Soldiers were charged with the 
implementation of political objectives. For example, the British Army was charged with 
assisting a colonial administration to maintain control over a large population with a 
relatively small number of soldiers. 25 The conflict itself remains limited for the colonial 
forces, who withdraw when the costs become too high. While the COIN force initially 
fights hard to put down the insurgency, they are ultimately prepared to negotiate the 
future of the territory. However, in minority-ruled territories, the territory is non-
negotiable. The COIN force continues to fight hard, with what usually begins as a 
peripheral activity turning into a fight to the death.26 
In contrast, a political environment not conducive to learning COIN is a containment 
struggle. This is typical of US actions during the Cold War and its War on Terror. In this 
context, COIN is governed by a need to contain a designated threat to national 
survival. Threats are understood to be rooted in subversion by insidious elements 
interfering in the domestic situations of allies, and local discontent is dismissed as 
merely products of coercion by these elements. 27 War is likewise considered to be the 
domain of the military. The military has a great deal of control over strategies and 
policies, and" . once war is initiated, the military assumes primacy over politics".28 
A conducive political environment is thus a crisis of legitimacy in a colonial or minority-
ruled setting, in which resistance is executed through insurgency, and militaries 
implement political objectives. 
~' NagL CUlInterinslIrgenLY Lessonsfi'om Mala)'a and r'ietnalll, Learning to Eat SOllP With.4 Knile. 38. 
_6 For example. the conflict in Northern Ireland. South Africa. former Rhodesia. and IsraeUPalestine. 
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How pragmatic a military is will determine whether it learns COIN or not. A military 
which is pragmatic, emphasizes practice rather than theory. This practice is defined by 
adaptability, the incorporation of skills gained and the development of new skills to 
better address insurgency.29 
1.2.1.2.1. Theory 
The implementation of doctrine is indicative of a military's pragmatism. The more rigidly 
a military adheres to doctrine, the less pragmatic the institution. Instead, COIN doctrine 
works best when applied selectively in consideration of specific local circumstances. 
The British Army has arguably the best record with COIN of all armed forces. For the 
better part of its history there existed no set body of doctrine. Rather, soldiers had to 
adapt. 30 Instead of a venerated manual, experience was passed down from man to 
man, with soldiers having to draw on personal experience and that of their 
colleagues. 31 Even once doctrine was codified in the late 20 th century, it continued to 
be understood as merely a basis for thought. 32 Moreover, that" ... theoretical 
understanding of the nature of a particular conflict is insufficient by itself; 'models' do 
not fit perfectly because the circumstances of each conflict are different.,,33 Key to 
British success then, has been their flexible and uneven application of doctrine rather 
than any doctrinal adherence. 34 
In contrast, the US military's approach to doctrine has been rigid and inflexible. Its 
preference for conventional big-war theory and fixed application thereof has prevented 
the emergence of tactical operations aimed at the essence of insurgency, and impeded 
its ability to incorporate lessons from COIN.35 It has further attempted to universalize 
the application of theory and reduce the significance of local political situations. In this, 
doctrine has served to obscure rather than provide guidance in how to fight COIN 36 
29 Charters. 
30 Ibid" 179-182. 
31 Harmon. 33 and 36. 
:~ Nag\. Coul1lerinsurgency Lessonsfrom Mala)'a and I·ietnam. Learning to Eat Soup It'ith A Knife. 7. 
Charters. 194. 
34 Beckett and Pimlott 3. 
35 Robert M. Cassidy. "Winning the War of the Flea. Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare:· Militwy Review 
84 (September/October 2004): 41; Sam C. Sarkesian. Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era. 
Lessonsfi'om Malaya and I'ie/nam (Westport and London: Greenwood Press. 1993). 10; Sam C. 
Sarkesian. "The American Response to Low-Intensity Conflict: the Formative Period:· in Armies in Low-
Intensity Conflict. A Comparative AnaZvsis. eds. David Charters and Maurice Tugwell (London: 
Brassey"s Defence Publishers. 1989).42. 











Therefore, a pragmatic military applies theory selectively and according to the specific 
circumstances of a specific conflict. Instead, an unpragmatic military is rigid in its 
application and attempts to universalize theory. 
1.2.1.2.2. Practice 
Relying on practice involves relying on experience gained and a willingness to adapt to 
new things. Knowledge gained in prior encounters with COIN is rooted in a military's 
formative experiences, structure, access to resources, and culture. 
1.2.1.2.2.1. Formative Experiences 
Formative experiences are the first or primary experiences of a military which 
determine and shape a military's way of war. In this, a military's first impressions are 
definitive impressions, and the last war that a military remembers defines how it fights. 
A tradition of flexibility is rooted in the British Army's extensive colonial experience, in 
which it engaged in colonial policing, and countered numerous revolts and uprisings. 
The continual challenges, varied threats, and diverse geographical conditions 
necessitated" ... a constant need to adapt responses to fit local circumstances ... ,,37 
Through this a series of responses emerged and were adapted to fit specific 
circumstances. 38 Of note is Thompson's Defeating Communist Insurgency. Writing in 
the wake of Malaya, Thompson outlined a need for a combined political and military 
response, and emphasized the need for intelligence, the use of elite units and minimum 
force. 39 Malaya was deeply significant in informing British thinking and methods. The 
army subsequently makes use of special forces and minimum force, aims to establish a 
clear political directive, constantly revises tactics, and emphasizes the need to adjust 
tactics to specific conditions. 40 However, whereas others look to Malaya as the 
fundamental how-to approach, the British themselves have applied it selectively41 
In contrast, the US has had a fairly dissimilar history. Prior to Vietnam, the military had 
a relatively positive history with COIN in the Philippine insurgency. However, this 
37 John Pimlott "The British Army: The Dhofar Campaign. 1970-1975." in Armed Forces and Modern 
COlinter-lnslirgenc\·. eds. Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott (London and Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd. 
1985).19. 
38 Ibid .. 19-20. 
39 Specifically. Thompson outlined 5 basic principles: the government must have a clear political aim to 
defeat the insurgency: the security forces must function within the law: the roles of all agencies must be 
defined and coordinated: priority must be given to defeating political subversion: and the government 
must secure territory and win over the inhabitants before carrying out actions against the guerrillas. 
Thompson. 50-62: Ian F. W. Beckett "Guerrilla Warfare: Insurgency and Counter-insurgency Since 
1945," in War/eire in the Twentieth Century. Them:r and Practice. eds. Colin McInnes and G. D. 
Sheffield (London: Hyman. 1988).208. 
40 Charters. 202. 











experience was never regarded as the core business of the military. Instead the Civil 
War and World Wars defined the American way of war as absolute war, involving large 
numbers of men and material, firepower and direct action to annihilate the enemy.42 
Failure in Vietnam resulted in the COIN experience being considered an anathema to 
the military's core conventional function, and any knowledge gained was not 
incorporated into the military's institutional memory.43 In this, the military has a 
singularly short institutional memory in which formative ideas were set and have 
subsequently failed to change.44 
As such, formative experiences define how a military wages war. If a military's 
formative experiences encouraged flexibility and adaptability, the military will be well-
suited to learning COIN. Or rather, if the military has been bred on countering uprisings 
and insurgencies, it will be well versed in features and capabilities required to do so. 
1.2.1.2.2.2. Structure 
COIN favours decentralized command and control structures. These foster flexibility 
and innovativeness, and allow for lower ranking officers to be decisive without referring 
back to a central command. Importantly, insurgency is a junior commander's war.45 
The regimental system by which the British Army has traditionally been structured 
favoured involvement in insurgent conflict. This system amounts to a highly 
decentralized structure, which has necessitated better training, discipline and unit 
cohesion among soldiers stationed for long periods of time in alien locations46 Varied 
experiences were fostered among different regiments, and in turn a sense of 
uniqueness. Regiment histories were likewise glorified in museums and member 
associations, engendering exclusive group identity and loyalty. Combined with 
deployments in far-flung places, the system further allowed for a fair amount of latitude 
among commanders in terms of strategy. It cultivated innovativeness and better quality 
leadership among officers at a lower level of responsibility, encouraging officers to take 
the initiative and be decisive in potentially explosive situations. 
~c NagL COlll1feril1SlIrgemy Lessons/i'om Mala)"a and I·ietnam. Learning to Eat SOIiP With A. Knife. 44-
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The US Army experience saw the development of an opposite type of structure, one 
based on central command, and characterized by large battalions of infantry supported 
by extensive quantities of artillery and close air support.47 This system requires officers 
to refer back to a central command for a decision, and is best used in a conventional 
battle in which action must be coordinated. However, it is most unsuitable for COIN in 
which relatively low-ranking soldiers are required to make split-second decisions 
without being able to contact central command. 
Therefore, decentralized command and control structures suit COIN best. A 
decentralized system necessitates better training at a lower level of responsibility, and 
for lower ranking officers to be decisive relatively independent of a central command. 
1.2.1.2.2.3. Resources 
Learning COIN depends on circumstances characterized by limited resources 
necessitating innovativeness, adaptability and the use of local forces. 
Imperial responsibilities resulted in the British Army being spread thinly on the ground, 
and being forced to make do with a limited number of resources in comparison to the 
vast territories which they commanded. In turn, the army took a low-profile response to 
revolt, " ... using their forces sparingly and searching for solutions which did not 
necessitate large expenditure of men or materiel ... ,,48 These conditions generated 
innovation and improvisation as key features of the organization, cooperation with local 
authorities, and the recruiting of local peoples to increase manpower. The British thus 
used the imperial approach, and made use of local forces as part of COIN. From India 
to Northern Ireland, these forces were invaluable in terms of their knowledge of the 
territory, peoples and " ... the nature of the particular rebellion they faced.,,49 
Thus, having to make do with few resources fosters flexibility and innovativeness. More 
significantly though, it encourages the use of the imperial approach to COIN, and as 
part of which, the use of local peoples to aid in countering insurgency. 
,\7 Nag!. COlinterinsliraenn' Lessons li'om Malava and i'ietnam. Learnina to Eat SOli/) With.4 Knife, 48. 48 ~ ".,... ,.., . 
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Learning is determined by a military's culture, the attitudes, values and beliefs which 
shape a military's understanding of when and how force is used. 50 A military will learn 
COIN if it has a culture open to doing so. Such a culture values adaptability. 
Culture determines how military institutions react. Not all militaries respond in the same 
way to the same challenge as they do not share the same mixture and types of ideas, 
values and attitudes. 51 A military's culture establishes a way of doing things, and limits 
actions in terms of it endorsing certain types of action and prohibiting others 52 How a 
military reacts and behaves is then accounted for in its cultural characteristics. 
Culture likewise determines whether a military is able to adapt doctrine to meet 
changes in its operational environment. This adaptation occurs only when institutional 
leaders agree that it is within the institution's long-term interests to do SO.53 In turn, how 
past experiences are remembered by leaders is key in understanding how militaries 
adapt to changes in their environment. How militaries perceive themselves, their role 
and mission further determines how they prepare for both peace and war, as well as 
how flexible they are in responding to unexpected situations when that war occurs.54 
As such, the British Army's culture allowed it to learn COIN effectively in Malaya. Its 
varied past characterized by flexibility in thought and action, created a culture open to 
the changes required to defeat a complex enemy in a new kind of war.55 In contrast, 
the US Army in Vietnam was unable to adapt both during and after the war. While 
failures were recognized and solutions suggested, they were rejected due to their not 
conforming to the army's understanding of how wars were to be fought. 56 
Therefore, whether militaries learn COIN or not is determined by their culture. If 
adaptability and innovation guided by past experiences is valued, if it is in their nature 
or the way they do things, a military will adapt successfully to COIN requirements. 
'0 Elizabeth Kier. "Culture and Military Doctrine. France between the Wars:' International Security 19 
~?pring 1995): 69-70: Cassidy. 41. 
Kier. 66 and 70. 
52 Ibid .. 78. 
53 John A. Nag\. "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. British and American Army Counterinsurgency 
Learning During the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War." World Aftairs 161 (Spring 1999): 193. 
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1.2.2. Continuing COIN 
Being able to learn COIN is dependent on fairly specific factors which cannot be 
replicated. Therefore, once a military has acquired COIN, it needs to keep and continue 
to develop it. This continuing of COIN is accomplished through theory, specialists and 
training programmes. Military tasks likewise tend to remain the same, and in a world 
dominated by insurgent conflict, a good knowledge of COIN is an invaluable resource 
by which to meet the demands of likely conflict environments. 
Knowledge from past experiences is captured within routines. Routines are passed on 
through socialization and education, conserving knowledge despite the turnover of 
personnel and the passage of time. 57 Routines are recorded in a body of knowledge 
about how to perform tasks. These bodies can endure and be lost. One means by 
which they endure is in doctrine. 58 Theory is doctrine, a guide to action and ideas of a 
military with regards to a specific task. While COIN theory may be best applied 
selectively, doctrine amounts to a body of knowledge by which concepts and guidelines 
can be recorded, revised and passed on to new members. 
Training further provides the opportunity to pass on the learning experience, foster a 
value of adaptability, and prepare a wide number of troops in COIN skills, which can 
then be applied in other settings. However, COIN knowledge is best kept within the 
structures that specialize in these tactics and methods, namely, the special forces units 
comprised of essentially irregular soldiers, whose primary features are adaptability, 
flexibility and innovativeness. Their core business is unconventional warfare, and as 
elites they constitute the key means by which to fight insurgency. 
Importantly, military tasks tend to remain the same in terms of the nature of those 
tasks, and regardless of time and the durability of bodies of knowledge. Continuing to 
learn COIN aids in entrenching institutional features such as innovativeness and 
flexibility, and allows a military to better overcome the weaknesses inherent to COIN. 
Through learning about the various approaches and their flaws, a military can better 
train for scenarios; familiarize itself with appropriate equipment; and improve suitable 
command and control structures. 
Insurgency is likewise the most predominant form of conflict in the world today. 
However, relatively few insurgencies are being addressed through direct COIN. Rather 
57 Barbara Levitt and James G. March, "Organizational Learning." Annual Reviel\" ofSocioloK)' 14 
~ 1988): 319 and 328. 












they are being tackled through PSOs. Considered an outdated term, COIN is now 
conducted under the auspices of MOOTW, and provides an essential framework for 
PSO doctrine in terms of operational concepts, tactics, skills and methods. 59 In a time 
in which PSOs are considered to be of ever greater importance as functions of 
militaries,60 and increasingly " ... Iook very much like traditional counterinsurgencY,,,61 
COIN knowledge helps a military be both more effective in insurgency, as well as in 
PSOs in insurgent conflicts. 
Thus COIN knowledge is best kept through theory, COIN training programmes and 
specialist structures which continue to practise COIN. Being that military tasks tend to 
remain the same, and the overwhelming prevalence of insurgency, continuing COIN is 
very much so relevant for meeting the needs of contemporary conflict environments, 
albeit direct COIN operations or PSOs in insurgent conflicts. 
1.2.3. Conclusion 
A military's capacity to learn COIN is determined by the existence of a conducive 
political environment and pragmatism within a military. A favourable environment 
amounts to a crisis of legitimacy within a colonial or minority-rule setting, and in which 
the crisis is articulated through insurgency. A pragmatic military is one which relies on 
practice over theory. While there is a place for theory in COIN, it must be applied rather 
than followed. A reliance on practice is founded in knowledge gained through formative 
experiences in which a military's way of war is defined by insurgency; decentralized 
command and control structures; limited resources; and a culture which values 
adaptability. All of which foster flexibility and innovativeness in the face of far-flung, 
foreign deployments. COIN knowledge is then conserved through theory, continued 
training and elite units which specialize in COIN. 
1.3. CONCLUSION 
Insurgency is the use of irregular methods and tactics in an asymmetric conflict with a 
superior military force, in rural and urban settings. It is aimed at overthrowing a ruling 
power, and is characterized by rural guerrilla action, urban uprising and rebellion, or 
59 Major David Strawbridge (British Peace Support Training Team). conversation with author. Pretoria. 
30 August 2005: Henri Boshoff, interview by author. Pretoria. 30 August 2005: United Kingdom 
Ministry of Defence. Joint Warfare Publication 3-50. The Military Contribution to Peace Support 
9t,erations. 2nd ed. (UK. June 2004). (A II) - (A 17). 
6 Rocklyn Williams. "How Primary is the Primary Function? Configuring the SANDF for Africana 
Realities." Afi'ican Security Reriew 8 (1999): Illtj):c W \\ \\. i~~.()r!!.La Phl12<;}\,-;R 8No611c)\\ Priman .hlill] : 
Theo Neethling. "Military Forces and Non-Traditional Military Roles: Assessing Post-Cold War 
Developments and Considering Some Implications for the SANDF." Journalfc)/' Co/1/emporary History 
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both. It is enduring as a method of warfare, and especially where state systems remain 
underdeveloped.52 COIN is the method of fighting used to put down and eliminate 
insurgency. It can be understood in terms of theory and practice. Practice refers to the 
practitioners of COIN, their methods, tactics and techniques; and theory to the ideas, 
principles, goals and guidelines informing these practitioners. 
Learning COIN warfare, however, is no straightforward task. Whether a military has the 
capacity to do so is determined by the presence of a conducive political environment 
and pragmatism within the respective military. Historically, a favourable political 
environment is a crisis of legitimacy struggle in a colonial or minority-rule setting. 
Pragmatism is a reliance on practice over theory. In this, theory or doctrine is applied 
selectively given the particular circumstances of a particular conflict. Practice relies on 
knowledge gained during a military's formative experiences and as a result of its 
structure, access to resources and culture. More specifically, a military will learn COIN 
through formative institutional experiences against insurgency; decentralized 
structures; a limited access to resources; and a culture which values adaptability. 
Once learned, COIN knowledge is conserved through theory, training programmes, 
and specialists in COIN warfare. Importantly, military tasks tend to remain the same, 
and in a world dominated by insurgent conflict, it is within the long-term interests of a 
military which has been able to learn COIN, to continue to do so. Moreover, given the 
nature of contemporary conflict, COIN knowledge likewise provides essential skills to 
meet the demands of conflict environments in which modern militaries are increasingly 
likely to find themselves. 
Therefore, COIN knowledge is a rare resource which not all have been able to acquire. 
While learning COIN does not guarantee successful COIN experiences, a military 
which has learned COIN in the past has an added resource on which it can draw when 
facing insurgency in the present. A military which continues to learn COIN, is a military 
which is flexible and innovative, can survive on limited resources in faraway places, 
and can adapt to new and different insurgent challenges. 











CHAPTER TWO: THE SADF: LEARNING COIN 
Favourable conditions for learning COIN existed in the burgeoning crisis of legitimacy 
faced by Apartheid rule, and the pragmatic approach taken by the military in 
addressing the crisis. For twenty years, the SADF remained distinctly unintellectual in 
its approach, and learned COIN against several, simultaneous insurgencies. This 
chapter will consider this learning of COIN by the SA military. It will first explore the 
favourable political environment in which the SADF learned COIN, followed by the 
military's pragmatism towards COIN in its reliance on practice over theory. 
2.1. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: ONSLAUGHT 
From the 1960s, the white minority regime was challenged by insurgency both 
internally and externally. A crisis of legitimacy took hold from 1960, when armed 
resistance was declared by the ANC in South Africa, in the wake of the Sharpeville 
Massacre. Resistance likewise emerged in then occupied South West Africa (Namibia), 
and was led by SWAPO. Resistance took the shape of insurgency, including both rural 
guerrilla warfare and urban uprising. The ANC and SWAPO were further assisted by 
independent neighbouring frontline states. With the independence of Mozambique and 
Angola in the mid-1970s, the crisis came to be seen as a total onslaught by the regime, 
and the military a means by which to counter it. Thus, the political environment was set 
for the SA military to learn COIN. 
2.1.1. Insurgency & COIN 
2.1.1.1. Pre 1974 
The SADF fought both internal and external, urban and rural insurgency. Given the 
scope of the military, guerrilla tactics were the only option for an armed struggle. 53 
2.1.1.1.1. Namibia 
South Africa occupied Namibia since the end of World War II. This occupation had 
since been declared illegal by the International Court of Justice, however, South Africa 
had refused to withdraw. As such, Namibia resembled an anti-colonial struggle. 
SWAPO waged a more classic guerrilla war, and primarily within the border areas of 
Kaokoland, Kavango, Caprivi and Ovambo. It was an essentially rural insurgency with 
(" Abiodun Alao. "A Comparative Evaluation of the Armed Struggle in Namibia. South Africa and 











bases across borders in neighbouring states, over which small units of insurgents were 
infiltrated, and made use of hit-and-run tactics, sabotage and assassination.54 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, COIN was the responsibility of the SAP. 
However, from 1972, the SADF became involved after a state of emergency had been 
declared in Ovambo following a series of strikes in 1971 and 197265 By 1973, the 
SADF had replaced the SAP on the border (Operational Zone) between Namibia and 
Angola. This placement, out of sight on the far-flung northern border of Namibia was 
ideal for learning COIN. 
As such, the conditions in Namibia were tailor-made for learning COIN: a classic rural 
insurgency in a remote territory, against a colonial-type regime. 
2.1.1.1.2. South Africa 
The South African insurgency faced many difficulties from the start. While initially 
uninvolved, the SADF became progressively more prominent in COIN from the 1970s. 
In 1961, the ANC established MK, and conducted sabotage attacks against economic 
targets. 55 However, a police raid on MK headquarters on 11 July 1963, resulted in the 
arrest of virtually the entire internalleadership.57 With leaders either in prison or exile, 
military action remained limited. The struggle became defined by attempts to develop 
underground structures, train insurgents, but with little opportunity to carry out 
operations. Then, in 1969, a new strategy was adopted, and called for a protracted 
armed struggle requiring mass political mobilization.58 Influenced by Mao, the strategy 
emphasized the countryside as the primary theatre of insurgency.59 However, while the 
ANC conducted rural action from beyond the borders of the country, their struggle was 
6.1 William Minter. Apartheid's Contra.\·. An Inquiry into the Roots ol War in Angola and Mo=amhique 
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fraught with problems. Namely, an urbanized society, with few rural areas that could in 
fact sustain insurgency.7o 
As in Namibia, the police were charged with addressing the crisis, and initially the 
military maintained a low profile in terms of the insurgency.71 However, as threats 
expanded from the late 1960s, and the SAP failed to make headway in eliminating the 
insurgency, the government increasingly turned to the military. 
Thus, the insurgency struggled in it early years due to a lack of leadership and 
unfavourable conditions for rural insurgency. While initially uninvolved, the SADF 
progressively replaced the SAP as the forerunning institution in addressing the crisis. 
2.1.1.1.3. Frontlines 
Prior to 1974, South Africa existed in a neighbourhood of white minority-rule. Angola 
and Mozambique were under Portuguese control, and Rhodesia under the settler 
regime of Ian Smith. Insurgencies against these regimes were underway by the late 
1960s, and both SWAPO and the ANC were in contact with these movements. 
The buffer of settler states over-extended infiltration and communication between 
internal insurgents and those in exile. The ANC responded by supporting regional 
insurgencies. 72 In return, MK was permitted to use these states to train guerrillas and 
launch operations. Of note was their support of Zimbabwean insurgents.73 
Pariahs in their own right, Apartheid found allies in the Portuguese and Smith regimes. 
Their alliance dominated the region, and Pretoria aided in countering regional 
insurgency. The SAP were sent to Rhodesia from 1967, and along with later army 
units, gained extensive COIN experience with the Rhodesian security forces. 74 
As regional insurgency intensified during the 1970s, so did Pretoria's involvement. 
Consequently, assistance between regional insurgents and those confronting Apartheid 
resulted in South African forces acquiring diverse, regional COIN experience. 
70 M inter, I 16. 
71 Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militari::ation ojSouth Ali-ican Politics (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 
1986),9. 
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73 Gavin Cawthra. Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine (London: International Defence & Aid 
Fund for Southern Africa, 1986), 18: See Thula Bopela and Daluxolo Luthuli. Umkhonto we Si::lI"e. 
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2.1.1.2. Post 1974 
In 1974, a military coup occurred in Portugal. The Portuguese withdrew from Angola 
and Mozambique, giving SWAPO and MK direct access to Namibia and South Africa. 
From a relatively peripheral activity, COIN now became a fight to the death. 
2.1.1.2.1. Namibia 
Angolan independence reinvigorated the Namibian insurgency. SWAPO and its armed 
wing PLAN were able to better infiltrate across the border. Occupation continued, and 
operations against SWAPO bases in Angola were launched from the Operational Zone. 
SWAPO was granted permission by the MPLA to establish training bases in Angola. 
Insurgents were now able to infiltrate across 1376 km of border, and to do so into 
densely populated areas. 75 Command centres and training camps were established, 
and popular support cemented. 76 From 1979, PLAN moved into a new phase, 
conducting strikes on infrastructure, economic and communication targets; and 
attempting to expand operations deeper into the country. 
However, intensified COIN in Namibia, and support for UNITA to counter SWAPO and 
overthrow the MPLA, began making infiltration difficult. Bases became insecure and 
lines of supply were disrupted. As the SADF began moving towards conventional war, 
so PLAN likewise began moving from using small mobile units, to more conventional 
tactics and structures.77 By the late 1980s, the focus of the war had moved to the more 
conventional conflict between South Africa and UNITA, and PLAN, the MPLA and the 
Cubans in the border region and southern Angola. 
After the independence of Angola, the parameters of the Namibian insurgency changed 
and progressed. COIN by the SADF spilled over into Angola, and the conflict moved 
towards more mobile and conventional war. 
2.1.1.2.2. South Africa 
2.1.1.2.2.1.1974 -1983 
The independence of the Portuguese colonies and the Soweto riots in 1976 altered the 
dimensions of the South African conflict and radicalized the participants. 
7' TRC of South Africa Report. "National Overview." (87); Minter. 114. 
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The independence of Angola and Mozambique allowed the ANC to establish bases 
within the borders of these countries, with FRELIMO providing MK transit to South 
Africa. 78 A variety of training programmes were initiated in camps in Angola, and by 
1977 MK began infiltrating into the country.79 However, for the state, decolonization 
brought its defence line to its borders, and Pretoria became convinced that the state 
was being subjected to a communist total onslaught. 80 
Then, in June 1976, school children in Soweto rioted against the government's attempt 
to impose Afrikaans as the language of instruction in schools. The riots spread across 
the country. Many of those who participated were radicalized and left the country to join 
the likes of MK. The riots were simultaneously the most serious challenge to the state 
since Sharpeville, and the fear of these individuals returning to overthrow the state, 
radicalized Pretoria's response. This radicalization became synonymous with 
militarization as the SADF began to dominate policy B1 
From 1978, the ANC guerrilla strategy was altered to include urban action and the 
urban working class. 82 MK stepped-up its urban bombing campaign, with acts 
becoming both more frequent and high-profile. 83 However, the ANC did not have a 
stable external base. Communication and supply routes were dispersed; the ability to 
establish internal bases and carry out meaningful, internal operations was restricted; 
and in turn, so was the ability to move the struggle to full-scale guerrilla war.84 
Nevertheless, Pretoria thoroughly believed that the ANC was moving towards the 
revolutionary overthrow of the state. As a result, the NSMS was created to govern the 
war, and meet the need for coordinated action. 8s The NSMS became fully operational 
78 TRC of South Africa Report ""National Overview." (84). 
79 Williams. 'The Other Armies: Writing the History of MK:' 28. 
80 South African National Defence Force Nodal Point Suhmission IRO the Former SADF (South Africa: 
SANDF. 1996).5: Kevin O·Brien. ""Special Forces for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South 
African Case:' Small Wars and Insurgencies 12 (Summer 200 I): 83: Cawthra. 29-31. 
81 Stephen Ell is. "The Historical Significance of South Africa' s Third Force:' Journal oj'Sowhern 
Aj'rican Studies 24 (June 1998): 266. 
8~ TRC of South Africa Report. ""National Overview:' (112)-(113). 
8, Minter. 116. For example: police stations throughout the country: the SASOL coal-oil refinery in June 
1981: the Koeberg nuclear station in December 1982: a rocket attack on the SADF's Voortrekkerhoogte 
military complex in August 1981: and a car bomb outside the South African Air Force's headquarters in 
May 1983. 
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in 1979. It was dominated by military, intelligence and police personnel, and took over 
the formulation and execution of policy.s6 
Therefore, the period following the independence of Angola and Mozambique saw an 
escalation of violence by both the insurgents and the state, and a further radicalization 
all participants in the wake of the 1976 riots. 
2.1.1.2.2.2. 1983 - 1990 
1983-1990 was characterized by a general offensive aimed at making South Africa 
ungovernable, with attacks being more spontaneous and arising out of mass resistance 
rather than organized guerrilla action. S? Urban revolt ensued as rolling mass action 
aimed to make Apartheid unworkable through protests, strikes and boycotts. 
Despite uprisings across the country and greater internal organization during the mid-
1980s, the 1986 State of Emergency suffocated ANC internal structures. Progress was 
further hindered by the reluctance of neighbouring states to continue to provide refuge. 
Most significant was Mozambique. As a primary infiltration route, the move severely 
restricted MK's ability to conduct operations Bs By the late 1980s, the leadership began 
moving towards the conclusion that a settlement would have to be sought. s9 This was 
furthered by the impact of the end of the war in Angola, and the reduction in support 
from the communist world as the Cold War unravelled. Therefore, the ANC did not 
succeed in toppling the state militarily. Despite their successes, MK remained an army-
in-exile. It largely failed to gain control over any part of the South African territory, and 
perpetrated operations overwhelmingly from outside of the country.90 
Nevertheless, in 1985-86 total onslaught was replaced by revolutionary onslaught, 
reflecting the belief that the ANC had moved into the mobile war stage of its 
86 The security institutions had been brought together in the SSC in 1972. which was to be a central body 
by which policy was determined and implementation coordinated. However. by the mid-late 1970s. the 
SSC had thus far failed to promote departmental coordination. As a result the NSMS was created. 
Nevertheless. the SSC remained at the core ofthe NSMS and amounted to an inner cabinet chaired by the 
State President. Cawthra. Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine. 32 and 49. Seegers. The Militm:v in 
the Making olAfodern South Alrica. 165; Chris Alden. Apartheid's Last Stand. The Rise and Fall olthe 
South A/dean Security State (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1996).72. 
87 See Cawthra. Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine. 217-218. 
88 Howard BarrelL "The Outlawed Liberation Movements." in South A/;'iw: No Turning Back. (ed.) 
Shaun Johnson (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1988).60. The ANC were also expelled from Lesotho. 
Botswana and Swaziland. 
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revolutionary war. The State of Emergency further allowed for the security services to 
gain the initiative by 1987.91 However, simultaneously, mass action began to generate 
a political and economic crisis for white power from within its own constituency. The 
war in Namibia had become too costly. As a result, prominent white businessmen and 
academics visited ANC leaders in exile, and the NIS began secret talks with the ANC. 92 
The state's domestic and regional activities prevented MK from developing into a 
serious military threat. ANC attempts to wage insurgency never attained the likes of 
those in Zimbabwe or Namibia. 93 However, the state was neither victorious, and was 
toppled by mass action and the economic, political and human costs of COIN. 
2.1.1.2.3. Frontlines 
The decolonization of regional states fundamentally altered Pretoria's strategic 
position. The primary concern became the perceived growth of the Soviet-inspired 
threat (rooi gevaar) and the need to prevent infiltrations. 
Apartheid leaders aimed to discourage neighbouring states from providing insurgents 
refuge via trade and aid incentives. 94 However, when this failed, Pretoria launched a 
campaign involving sabotage, raids, assassination, and the supporting of dissident 
forces. 95 For example, the SADF had continued to support the Rhodesian forces until 
late 1979. On independence, South African forces absorbed thousands of Rhodesian 
personnel. Many of whom were assigned to special forces units and then infiltrated 
back into Zimbabwe to conduct destabilization operations. 
Despite denying it, Pretoria followed a relentless policy of destructive engagement 
towards its neighbours. 96 However, while all neighbouring states were subjected to 
destabilization, " ... ideology and geography made Angola and Mozambique special 
91 Ellis and Sechaba. 173-174; TRC of South Africa Report. "National Overview:' (164). 
9" See Allister Sparks. Tomorrow is Another COllntry. The Inside StOlY oj'Sollth A/i-ica '.\' /\'egotiated 
S.ettlement (Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers. 2003. first published 1995). 
9, Minter. 112. 
9~ Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, Frontline Southern Afi·ica. Destructi\'e Engagement (New York: 
F,our Walls Eight Windows. 1988),21-22; Cawthra, Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine. 140-141. 
9, The SADF likewise established the Lesotho Liberation Army to destabilize Lesotho. and trained 
individuals to conduct destabil izing activities in the likes of Botswana and Zambia. Johnson and Martin. 
xxi; Cawthra. Brlltal Force. The Apartheid War Machine. 139-140 and 168-169. 
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targets.,,97 Angola was kept as unstable as possible through support for UNITA, and 
operations against Angolan infrastructure to force the MPLA to stop supporting 
SWAPO.98 Also, being that the two countries provided alternate routes to the coast for 
countries in the interior, attacking Angolan and Mozambican infrastructure ensured that 
Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Swaziland remained dependent on South 
African portS. 99 
Destabilization was initially carried out relatively indiscriminately, however, by 1982, 
Pretoria became more selective in its targets. 100 This policy eventually led to non-
aggression agreements with Angola and Mozambique in 1984, which required these 
countries to end support for the ANC and SWAPO, and for Pretoria to cease supporting 
UNITA and RENAMO. 101 However, Pretoria made no serious effort to implement them. 
Instead "[t]he wars continued with scarcely a pause.,,102 
2.1.2. Total Onslaught 
The SADF's approach to COIN emerged during the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
however, was only formally articulated within the later ideological framework of total 
onslaught. This onslaught was considered to be aimed at all aspects of society, was 
" ... inspired from abroad and coordinated by the communist powers.,,103 The concept 
defined how the government reacted to the crisis, and by 1973, elementary versions 
were included in defence documents. However, it was only in the 1977 Defence White 
Paper that total onslaught and its response was articulated and entrenched within the 
SADF's threat assessment. 104 In this paper, lay South Africa's COIN wars. 
Noting the need for interdependent and coordinated action, the paper argues for the 
necessity of Total National Strategy to be formulated at the highest level. 105 Objectives 
included: securing the government and its institutions; identifying, preventing and 
countering subversion and revolution; and countering any form of revolutionary action. 
97 Minter, 119. 
9R TRC of South Africa Report. "The State Outside South Africa (1960-1990)." r'olume 2 (Cape Town: 
Juta & Co Ltd. 1998). (50) - (51). (54). and (58). 
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The national defence structure was to be developed to be able to counter any threat. 
COIN warfare was to be provided for, and permanent force soldiers were to form the 
nucleus of the SADF. Intelligence networks and a capability for operating anywhere in 
the region were to be developed. While the SAP were responsible for countering 
internal unrest, the army was likewise required to provide support. 1G6 Prime Minister 
Vorster was not entirely convinced by this strategy, however, was persuaded otherwise 
in order to counter the growing unrest. As Nortje argues, "It was a watershed decision 
that would shape both the face of war and the psyche of an entire generation on the 
African subcontinent.,,1G7 The relationship between the SADF and SAP was set, 
destabilization put into effect, local peoples recruited, special forces developed, and 
COIN training intensified. 
As the total onslaught evolved into revolutionary onslaught, so internal deployment of 
the army increased. 1G8 To cope with rising internal unrest, the capabilities and area 
coverage of the Commandos was expanded in 1982, and by 1986 the SADF was being 
used alongside the police to maintain law and order.1G9 
Total onslaught thus reflected both the mindset of Apartheid leaders and their sense of 
the challenge to their authority. It shaped their response to that challenge, and was 
central in the justification and rationalization of learning COIN by the military. 
2.1.3. Conclusion 
Insurgency both within and beyond South Africa amounted to a crisis of legitimacy for 
the white minority ruled Apartheid state. This crisis came to be understood in terms of a 
total and later revolutionary onslaught. Insurgency got underway during the early 1960s 
in Namibia and South Africa. The former was characterized by rural guerrilla action, 
and the latter reflected both rural action and urban uprising. The insurgencies were 
limited prior to the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. However, 
after, the insurgencies spilled over into these states through insurgents using them as 
bases, and destabilization carried out by Pretoria in and against these states for 
supporting the insurgencies. This political environment was ideal for learning COIN, 
and allowed the SADF to acquire extensive experience in several, varied COIN wars. 
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As the SADF's engagement with COIN intensified from the late 1960s, the military took 
a pragmatic approach to learning COIN. While dipping into theory, the SADF preferred 
to rely on practice. This preference drew on formative experiences, decentralized 
structures, a need to make do with few resources, and an inherent willingness to adapt. 
The SADF thus embraced a favourable approach and learned COIN. 
2.2.1. Theory 
The SADF was either preparing for or conducting COIN, resulting in a dramatic 
expansion and revision of doctrine. The policy framework of total onslaught was 
translated into a Total National Strategy. This strategic doctrine was embodied in the 
1977 White Paper, and served as the basis of the SADF's response to insurgency. It 
amounted to a comprehensive doctrine, and emphasized the political, military and 
economic aspects of COIN warfare. 110 
Total strategy drew inspiration from a variety of sources, however, most notably the 
French general Andre Beaufre and his An Introduction to Strategy.111 Total strategy can 
be understood as a development of Beaufre's indirect strategy. Based on French COIN 
experiences in Indochina and Algeria, Beaufre advocated that total onslaughts demand 
total, indirect counter-strategies that coordinate military policy with political and 
economic policy. 112 Strategies by which the result is " ... achieved primarily ... by 
methods in which the military play no more than an auxiliary role.,,113 
SADF theory was also influenced by former army chief, Lieutenant-General C.A. Pop 
Fraser. Influenced by French experiences and a veteran of Malaya, Fraser wrote 
several documents on COIN during the 1960s. His Lessons Drawn from Past 
Revolutionary Wars became a blueprint for COIN strategy. According to Fraser, the 
basic site of revolutionary warfare was the population, and thus counter-revolutionary 
warfare must operate on the same terrain. 114 
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American J. J. McCuen and his The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War was likewise 
influential. 115 Like many other theorists of the 1960s, McCuen held a mirror to what 
Mao had said about guerrilla warfare, that guerrilla warfare was a protracted, phased 
struggle. Consequently, counter-revolution" ... had to arrest the progression in its 
prevailing phase, then force the guerrilla back into an earlier phase.,,116 In turn, the 
SADF held that any strategy was dependent on the asseSSing of the particular stage of 
development of the insurgency. This was then to be followed by the implementation of 
a counter-phase. 117 Considered to be more practical than 8eaufre, McCuen was 
applied both in Namibia and domestically.118 
However, there was recognition within the military that local conditions made it unwise 
to merely translate established theories. Instead, SADF leaders found themselves 
obliged to improvise. 119 Additional cases were drawn on, namely, Kenya, Israel, and 
Latin America, and strategy was understood to require continual adaptation to 
changing situations. 12o 
Revolutionary onslaught was articulated in the 1986 White Paper on Defence, and was 
understood to be as a result of developmental problems. In turn, the state attempted to 
buy legitimacy in exchange for socio-economic benefits.121 SADF theory became 
centred on halting and reversing revolutionary organization through the influencing of 
the population to support evolutionary change. Grievances were to be addressed, 
revolutionaries taken out, and communities organized under favourable leaders.122 
However, this new version merely justified terror and violence as the SADF 
increasingly resorted to force. 123 
More broadly, the SADF took a WHAM approach and advocated a struggle that was 
80% political and 20% military. Recognizing the need to act as part of a political plan, 
Pretoria persisted in thinking that the provision of benefits would bring about legitimacy. 
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However, the SADF ultimately failed to check the growing support for the insurgents. 124 
Total and revolutionary onslaught were primarily political rather than military theories. 
Yet, together they bred zealousness and fanaticism. 125 While the notion of WHAM was 
instilled in the higher ranks and DMI, such ideas tended to decline in the lower ranks 
where blatant racism dominated. 126 
Either way, in practice the SADF tended towards the imperial approach. Independence 
strife, disunity and civil war within the region lent to " ... the recruiting of locals to fight 
outsiders' causes.,,127 The independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 
presented the SADF with a number of opportunities for establishing and supporting 
fighting units comprised of enemies of Apartheid's enemies. This included recruiting 
former opponents of new regimes and COIN specialists displaced after independence, 
as well as supplying already existing movements. 128 Through these the SADF was able 
to wage COIN against the insurgents, and to affect instability within the states which 
harboured them, ultimately discouraging the support of such forces. 
Therefore, the SADF largely discounted theory and preferred to rely on experience. 129 
Instead of attempting to implement a set theory, the SADF applied theories selectively 
and in accordance with local circumstances. Moreover, for all its WHAM rhetoric, the 
military ultimately embraced the imperial approach to COIN, and was to make 
extensive use of local forces. 
2.2.2. Practice 
Despite developing COIN theory, the SADF's primary source of inspiration was its 
practice. Both this approach and its experiences, structure and access to resources 
allowed for the military to learn COIN. Its early encounters with COIN were defined by 
varied experiences in southern Africa, regimental and decentralized key structures, few 
resources and the use of the imperial approach to contra-mobilize forces to 
compensate for its shortage in manpower. In line with its historical traditions, this 
response to insurgency was one indicative of a culture open to adaptation. 
2.2.2.1. Formative Experiences 
The forerunner to the SADF was the UDF. As part of its formation the UDF adopted 
British military practices, and a role which included preventing and suppressing 
I~~ Grundy. 27: Seegers. The Military in the Making olModern South Aji-ica. 150 and 216: Minter. 113. 
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terrorism and internal disorder, and undertaking policing duties. 130 Through this the 
military was primarily involved in policing the disenfranchised and dealing with 
challenges from below.131 This historical, colonial-type policing role prepared the SAOF 
for COIN as they looked to the methods of others with more direct experience. 
The SAOF provided covert assistance to the Portuguese and the Rhodesians during 
the 1960s and 1970s.132 The long-term impact of these experiences is seen in the 
methods and tactics used by the SAOF. For example, the turning of captured 
insurgents and pseudo-operations. 133 The integration of members of the Portuguese 
and Rhodesian security forces (many of whom were seasoned COIN specialists) 
likewise allowed for a direct absorption of knowledge into the SAOF. 134 SAOF members 
also received training abroad. Training in Israel, for example, is evident in their use of 
pre-emptive attacks on external insurgent bases.135 Known as forward defence, this 
tactic began to be used during the late 1970s, and resulted in an increase in raids on 
specific targets, and later deep-penetration pre-emptive strikes. 136 
However, the most significant influence on SAOF methods were those of the SAP. The 
SAOF adopted many practices of the SAP's Security Branch in the Operational Zone. 
Many of these policemen had been deployed in Rhodesia where they had trained in 
COIN with the Selous Scouts, including cross-border raids on insurgent bases, pseudo-
operations, the turning of captured insurgents, and the recruiting of displaced 
soldiers. 137 When these policemen were officially withdrawn from Rhodesia in 1975, 
many were then sent to Namibia, taking these methods with them. From there they 
were militarized by Army Intelligence and the OMI. However, when the Security Branch 
left the Operational Zone, the SAOF had to fend for itself in terms of information 
gathering. The military made considerable efforts to improve their intelligence 
capacities, for example, with the transferral of Army Intelligence officers to the 
1,0 This role was defined in the 1912 Defence Act, by which the UDF was created. Seegers. The Militwy 
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in May 1978. This commando and bombing raid was conducted as part of Operation Reindeer. and killed 
over 600 SWAPO supporters. After Cassinga, pre-emptive attacks became standard within the overall 
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Operational Zone to work as interrogators. Importantly, such officers made use of 
Security Branch methods in Angola, Namibia, and later in South Africa. 138 
Of note were those used by the Security Branch's paramilitary unit Koevoet. Koevoet 
was established in 1979 and was modelled on the Selous Scouts and Portuguese 
Flechas. Many members were veterans of the Rhodesian war, and were trained in 
" ... the art of ambushing, tracking, bush survival and murder.,,139 The unit dominated 
COIN in Namibia and operated as a combat unit, tracking and apprehending suspected 
insurgents over long distances and difficult terrain. The unit made use of informers, 
pseudo-operations, and members of local communities, with the majority of Koevoet 
personnel being Ovambo. 14o Recruits also included turned SWAPO fighters (askaris). 
The SAP likewise made use of death squads, and the likes of torture and extrajudicial 
killing as standard techniques. In turn, the military created, for example, the CCB death 
squad, and torture was institutionalized as a military technique. 141 When back on home 
soil during the 1980s, OMI brought these methods with, and used their Namibian 
practice to interpret information, identify targets, and cultivate sources. 142 
Thus the SAOF acted on the precedents of others, and" ... claimed that they learned 
from others and then perfected lessons learnt through local practice.,,143 The Namibian 
experience defined SAOF COIN. It was used as a laboratory in which COIN strategies 
were tried and tested, and was an arena in which the SAOF learned by doing, as well 
as from the SAP. 144 Importantly, this encounter with COIN fundamentally shaped how 
the SAOF waged war. Many of the methods developed in Namibia were then 
transferred to the domestic campaign. 145 
138 Ibid., 185, 196 and 113; Cawthra, Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine, 18. 
139 Denis Herbstein and John Evenson, The Devils Are Among Us. The War for Namibia (London and 
New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1989), 64. 
140 TRC of South Africa Report, "The State Outside South Africa (1960-1990)," (116); Seegers, The 
Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, 225. 
141 TRC of South Africa Report, "The State Outside South Africa (1960-1990)," (96) and (122). 
142 Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, 186-187, 249 and 313. 
143 Ibid., 191. 
144 Cawthra, Securing South Africa's Democracy. Defence, Development and Security in Transition, 43. 












2.2.2.2.1. Structures & Specialists 
The structure of the army was a compromise between the British standing model and a 
modified commando system used earlier by the Afrikaners to wage frontier wars.146 
The army consisted of permanent and part-time soldiers divided into two main 
operational wings: a conventional force; and a larger COIN or Territorial Force. The 
latter was divided into ten regional commands and the Walvis Bay military area. It was 
charged with maintaining internal security, supporting the SAP and preventing border 
infiltrations. The infantry division of the army was the backbone of the army, and was 
comprised of 16 Permanent Force and full-time National Service (conscript) units, 45 
part-time Citizen Force units and more than 200 Commando units - all of which were 
trained in COIN. Importantly, all members of the army were trained in COIN, including 
tank and artillery regiments, which were deployed as such when required. 147 
Specific COIN forces were organized under the Area Defence system, in which Citizen 
Force and conscript units provided a reaction force in each territorial command. Area 
Defence amounted to rural COIN. It came about as a result of the intensification of the 
insurgency, and the need to counter border infiltrations and eliminate any internal 
insurgent bases. 148 The commandos or local militias (divided into rural, urban and 
industrial commandos) were central in Area Defence, and supported the SAP in 
defending a designated territorial area. 
The special forces, however, were the backbone of the COIN fighting force. Overt 
regional engagement began with Operation Savannah, the SADF's 1975 invasion of 
Angola. 149 Importantly, the operation was conducted in the manner of a special forces 
operation,150 and in its wake, an Army Intelligence programme that had been training 
officers as special operators was expanded into the Reconnaissance Commandos or 
later Regiments (Recces). The Recces and other special forces units played a key role 
in the COIN wars, and were used to conduct direct operations against insurgents, 
\.\6 Cawthra. Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine. 6: Grundy. 7. 
\,\7 Grundy. 31: South African National Defence Force Nodal Point. 43: Mark Philips. "The Nuts and 
Bolts of Military Power: The Structure of the SADF," in l'f'ar and Society. The Militarisation olSouth 
Af;·ica. (eds.) Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan (Cape Town and Johannesburg: David Philip, 1989),20; 
Cawthra. Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine, 118-119. 
\.\8 Cawthra. Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine. 228. 
\.\9 The operation aimed to install a client UNITA/FNLA regime and began in August 1975. Despite some 
initial success. when unable to strengthen its forces, the SADF withdrew to just within the Angolan 
border. Ibid .. 24 and 146. 











pseudo-operations, train proxy forces internally and externally, and conduct 
destabilization in the region. 151 Importantly, active recruitment of former Angolan and 
Mozambican soldiers, Portuguese and Rhodesian officers, resulted in the Recces 
having a thorough knowledge of the region. 
During Savannah, the SAOF likewise encountered what remained of the FNLA, and 
turned them into an elite COIN battalion that operated in the Namibian/Angolan arena: 
the 32 or Buffalo Battalion. The 32 was employed solely as a COIN unit, and later in a 
semi-conventional capacity. It was considered that SWAPO was too numerous and 
well equipped to be taken head on, and instead guerrilla warfare was the only way to 
regain the initiative. As such, the 32 were designed to out-guerrilla SWAPO. 152 
Other specialist units included the 44 Parachute Brigade, the Headquarters Pathfinder 
Company of 44 Brigade, and the Army Intelligence Hammer Units. The latter were 
developed in the Eastern Cape Territorial Command, and were designed for urban and 
rural COIN.153 
The OMllikewise played a central role in COIN, and particularly from the 1970s during 
which it was deployed in the Operational Zone. 154 After the independence of Angola, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Special Forces was absorbed by OMI and became 
Special Operations (Spestake).155 Through this, the SAOF acquired a vast capacity for 
COIN domestically and regionally. Part of OMI was the OCI which created networks of 
informers and recruited former Rhodesian and FNLA soldiers. OCI acted much like the 
Security Branch and was active in all areas of COIN.156 OMllikewise created Oelta-40 
in 1979, a death squad which was renamed the CCB in 1986. It was comprised of 
former special forces and murder and robbery unit policemen, and conducted internal 
and external COIN.157 A further unit was the 08T. Responsible for liaisons with regional 
proxies, the unit was divided into 08T1 and OST2. 08T1 was responsible for UNITA, 
151 O·Brien. "Special Forces for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Case:' 80 and 96. 
152 See Nortje: Colonel Jan Breytenbach. The Buffa/o Soldiers. The StOlY ojSolith Afi-ica '.I' 32-Ballalion, 
1975-1993 (South Africa: Galago. 2002).178. 
153 This included follow-up operations after infiltrations. intelligence operations. and cooperation with the 
SAP and the South African Railway Police. Sam Sole. '"The Hammer Unit and the Goniwe Murders." in 
The Hidden Hand. Co"ert Operations in South Africa. (eds.) Anthony M innaar. Ian Liebenberg and Char! 
Schutte (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council. 1994).279-280. 
15~ TRC of South Africa Report. '"Appendix. State Security Forces: Directory of Organizations and 
Structures:' r 'o/l/me 2 (Cape Town: Juta & Co Ltd. 1998). (33). 
:~: Seegers. The Militm:,' in the Making ojModern So lith Aj'rica. 185-186. 
) Ibid .. 185-186and213. 
1'7 A number of these policemen had even served time in prison. Jacques Pauw. Into the Heart oj 
Darkness. Conj'essiol1s o(Apartheid's Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers. 1997). 10: Guy 
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and DST2 for RENAMO and Zimbabwean dissidents. Similarly, during the 1980s, DST 
operated internally under Operation Marion (which assisted the IFP) and Operation 
Katzen (which targeted the Transkei and Ciskei Homelands).158 
Therefore, the SADF was comprised of various forces which were trained and 
designed for COIN warfare. While all forces acquired some COIN training, the primary 
soldiers involved in COIN were those in the commandos and the special forces. The 
DMI was likewise heavily involved in COIN, under which a number of structures were 
created and coordinated. As the backbone of the military's COIN fighting forces, they 
learned COIN devastatingly well. 
2.2.2.2.2. Methods & Techniques 
2.2.2.2.2.1. General Methods 
The army began training in COIN in 1968, and first became involved when deployed to 
replace the SAP in the Operational Zone. By 1973 it was an established part of 
training. 159 Overall, SADF COIN included classic methods and techniques: rural and 
urban patrols, roadblocks, crowd control, curfews, cordon-and-search operations, 
cross-border search-and-destroy incursions, and hot-pursuit missions. Local military 
capabilities were developed (the SWATF) and all military activities were brought under 
Defence Headquarters in Windhoek, through which Pretoria " ... exercised full control 
over ... all COIN activities ... ,,160 
Attempts were made to provide coordinated, reliable intelligence. 161 Captured 
insurgents were turned, and pseudo-operations conducted. Special units were created, 
such as the Recces and the 32. The Recces, for example, conducted clandestine and 
covert operations in South Africa and other African countries, although particularly 
northern Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. 162 While each regiment had 
specializations,163 overall they conducted long-range reconnaissance for strategic and 
158 TRC of South Africa Report, "'Appendix. State Security Forces: Directory of Organizations and 
Structures," (41 )-(43): TRC of South Africa Report, "The State Outside South Africa (1960-1990)," 
( 175). 
15~ Grundy, 9: Seegers, The Military in the Making ojModern SOllth AMm, 139. 
16 Toase, 209. 
161 South African National Defence Force Nodal Point, II. 
162 Lamb, "From Military to Civilian Life. The Case of Retired Special Forces Operators," 42. 
16, I Recce was an airborne regiment which specialized in external landward actions. 2 Recce was a 
Citizen Force organization for former Recces. 4 Recce was a seaborne regiment. specializing in the likes 
of underwater demolitions and diving. 5 Recce was an airborne and landward regiment that specialized in 
COIN warfare. 3 Recce was comprised of former Rhodesian SAS and Selous Scouts. Up until 1981 it was 
involved in operations in Zimbabwe. It then joined with Delta-40 and became Project Barnacle, under 











tactical intelligence gathering; strategic offensive action; sabotage; and COIN; often 
deep in enemy territory with minimal support. 164 
Importantly, techniques were both acquired from others and developed through 
experience with the insurgencies. Overall, the SADF acquired COIN skills in urban and 
rural Namibia, Angola and then South Africa, as well as cultural and environmental 
knowledge regarding southern Africa. 165 The decentralized nature of the specialist units 
established were likewise well suited to learning COIN and addressing insurgency 
within and beyond the borders of the country. 
2.2.2.2.2.2. Hearts, Minds & Something Else 
Beyond the special forces, the SADF likewise attempted a broader WHAM campaign in 
both Namibia and South Africa. 
While conscripts were used in patrols and offensive operations, they were also used to 
provide services such as teachers, engineers and veterinarians as part of Civic Action 
programmes introduced to Namibia in 1974. These programmes eventually fell under 
COMOPS, which conducted psychological operations and propaganda in Namibia, 
including radio broadcasts and dropping pamphlets over rural areas by air.166 These 
pamphlets aimed to discredit SWAPO and portray the military in a positive light. Some 
were subtly entitled "Join SWAPO and die".167 
Civic Action was aimed at securing the cooperation of the Namibian people by 
alleviating grievances. 168 SADF personnel were to promote good relations with the local 
population, combat undesirable elements, and protect" ... citizens against 
contamination by terrorists.,,169 However, actions often coincided with military 
operations, and instead of development, the vast majority of Namibians were living in 
deteriorating conditions. 17o As such, actions tended to be aimed against the population 
rather than in their defence or for their benefit. 171 
164 Paul Els. We Fear Naught Blit God. The StOlT olthe South African Special Forces (Johannesburg: 
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As the WHAM campaign failed, so SADF atrocities increased. The SADF aimed to 
weaken SWAPO through a series of voorsprong (advantage) operations, beginning 
with Operation Reindeer in 1978. This was followed by an emphasis on forward 
defence and several major incursions into Angola, reflecting the end of COIN's civic 
methods of persuasion and refining the fight as a frontier war.172 The SADF continued 
to profess that COIN was 80% political and 20% military, however, this was not being 
practised on foreign soil. From 1981, the SADF carried out bombing raids, infiltrated 
into southern Angola, mined roads, and destroyed villages. 173 
Undeterred by the failure of Civic Action in Namibia, the SADF made similar efforts in 
its internal WHAM campaign. Conscripts were deployed, propaganda pamphlets were 
spread, and black paramilitary organizations were developed. 174 However, the 
resurgence in unrest in 1983, resulted in the SADF being deployed extensively along 
the borders and as back-up to the SAP after October 1984.175 The 1985 State of 
Emergency gave the SADF further powers by which their activities" ... became virtually 
indistinguishable from those of the police.,,176 The SADF patrolled townships; broke up 
meetings; manned roadblocks; enforced curfews; shot and tear-gassed residents; and 
conducted cordon-and-search operations. 177 The 1986 State of Emergency resulted in 
more intensified cooperation with the SAP. However, by early 1987 the SADF began to 
playa less direct role, allowing conservative black forces to take the lead. 178 
As such, the SADF attempted to engage in WHAM, however, overwhelmingly failed to 
appreciate the flaws in their approach. The illegitimacy of the regime and the military's 
use of force made it impossible for such a campaign to be effective. 
2.2.2.3. Resources 
2.2.2.3.1. Access 
Access to material resources was limited as a result of arms embargoes in opposition 
to the regime. While attempts at self-sufficiency were successful to an extent, sanctions 
172 Operatio/1 Sceptic (June 1980). Operation Protea (August 1981). Operation Daisy (November 1981), 
Operation Super (March 1982), Operation Mehos (July-August 1982), Operation Phoenix (February-
April 1983), and Operation Askari (December 1983). Seegers, The Militwy in the Making o(Modern 
South A/hca, 226-227 and 239. 
173 Cawthra. Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine, 150: TRC of South Africa Report. "The State 
Outside South Africa ( 1960-1990)," (65). 
17~ Cawthra, Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine, 236-237.Grundv, 61: 
175 Seegers, The Militarl' in the Making o(Modern SOlllh .4/hca. 176. • 
176 Laurie Nathan. "Tro'ops in the Townships. 1984-1987:; in War and Society. The Militarisation of' 
South A/i·ica. eds. Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan (Cape Town and Johannesburg: David Philip). 67. 
177 South African National Defence Force Nodal Point, 62-66: Cawthra, Brutal Force. The Apartheid War 
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limited development and supply, and the SADF had to make do without. However, the 
most problematic shortage was manpower. 
In the face of heightened threat, an expansion programme for the SADF was launched 
in 1974. This resulted in a sharp rise in defence spending to R700 million in 1974-1975, 
peaking at R1800 million by 1978-1979.179 To promote self-sufficiency, ARMSCOR was 
established in 1974. However, its capacity for producing heavy armour was limited, and 
economic constraints proved a constant limitation. 18G Up until 1963, South Africa had 
received most of its armaments from Britain. In that year the UN imposed an arms 
embargo, however, it only became mandatory in 1977. Despite violations, the embargo 
hindered the development of equipment and technology, and led to serious 
shortages. 181 
However, the most significant shortage faced by the SADF was that of manpower. 
Securing sufficient human resources was a problem particularly with regards to the 
permanent force. For example, in 1977 permanent members only comprised 7% of the 
overall SADF.182 One solution was the extension of national service from 12 months to 
24 months. However, the need for greater numbers of permanent soldiers persisted 
with regards to operational duty, preparing the SADF for warfare, leading and training 
conscript units, and operating sophisticated weapons systems. 183 
Added to this was the military's reluctance to sustain casualties, particularly conscript 
casualties - no matter how imminent the rooi gevaar might have been, white South 
Africa was not quite convinced it was sufficiently perilous to warrant their sons coming 
home in body bags. This made it impossible for the SADF to withstand attrition, and as 
the situation worsened, so it necessitated the contra-mobilization of proxy forces, the 
use of UNITA, the 32, and SWATF. As the conflict became progressively conventional, 
the SADF's military vulnerabilities were exposed. 184 In terms of infantry, the SADF was 
limited to UNITA, 32 Battalion, and conscripts. Domestic deployment in the 1980s 
resulted in a further strain on manpower. As Minter argues, 'There were never enough 
179 This levelled out during the early 1980s, and did so despite an overall increase in SA OF activities. 
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white soldiers to cover all the fronts ... ,,185 Given white South Africa's sensitivity to 
casualties, military strategy aimed to reduce risks to white soldiers. As a result, 
success depended on allies and proxies. 186 
Access to material resources was increasingly limited due to the consequences of 
arms embargoes on the development and supply of equipment and technology. Access 
to sufficient manpower was limited in terms of the need for skilled permanent soldiers, 
and in the military's use and reliance on conscripts. Their use impacted on the SADF's 
ability to withstand attrition and necessitated the contra-mobilization of proxy forces. 
2.2.2.3.2. Imperial Methods & Uncivil Wars 
The arming and training of proxy forces was a distinct feature of the SADF's COIN, and 
was indicative of the military's imperial preference for COIN. Through this method they 
were able to keep the pot boiling, create and sustain enemies of their enemies, and 
create a number of civil wars in Southern Africa. 187 As a result, the domestic conflict 
was deflected beyond South Africa. The SADF came upon this method 
opportunistically in its encountering, incorporating and supporting of groups emerging 
out of bitter liberation and anti-colonial struggles in the region. Importantly, while the 
military took advantage of existing fracture-lines between external groups already at 
odds with each other, internally, it was more active in creating these fracture-lines. 
In Namibia/Angola, elite units were supported by segregated black units within the 
SWATF from 1974. For example, 201 Battalion (San) and 101 Battalion (Ovambo).188 
These capabilities were enhanced with the integration of disaffected members of the 
Flechas, Selous Scouts and Rhodesian SAS, who were assigned to the 32, Pathfinder 
Company and the Recces. Importantly, while some local peoples were recruited as 
volunteers, others were kidnapped and tortured into joining. 18g 
The SADF's most notable proxy forces were UNITA and RENAMO. As civil war 
unfolded in Angola, anti-communist UNITA was identified as the MPLA's primary 
enemy and as being the most friendly towards South Africa. Pretoria began supporting 
18) M' 17 ' S G d 78 Inter. _..1: ee run y, _ . 
186 Seegers. The AfilitwJ' in the Making olModern South Africa. 229. 
187 Pauw, 253: Seegers. The Military in the Making olModern SOllfh Af;·ica. 220-221 and 235: Cawthra. 
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188 Others included the I 02 Battalion (Kaokoland) and 202 Battalion (Kavango). All relied on volunteers 
until 1980 when conscription of indigenous people was put into effect. Cawthra. Brutal Force. The 












UNITA in its efforts to oust the MPLA, destabilize Angola and counter SWAPO. 190 
Pretoria similarly used RENAMO to destabilize Mozambique and counter the ANC. 
Having taken over RENAMO from the Rhodesians, the SADF unleashed a newly 
trained RENAMO in 1980, and escalated violence to include terrorism and sabotage. 191 
Both UNITA and RENAMO were dependent on the SADF for supplies and training. 
UNITA also received aid from the US, however, relied on the SADF for logistical 
support. While UNITA retained a degree of independence, the SADF was more directly 
involved with RENAMO's planning and strategy. 192 
Internally, contra-mobilization was used " ... to organize and support 'moderate blacks' 
to oppose the revolutionary movements.,,193 Similar to external operations, logistical 
and financial support was used to manage proxy forces. Most significant of which was 
the IFP from 1985. IFP hit-squads were developed to eliminate ANC leaders and 
supporters in Natal. 194 Training was conducted covertly under Operation Marion by DMI 
and the special forces. In 1986, 200 I FP members underwent training in the Caprivi 
Strip, and were instructed in interrogation techniques, weapons and hit-squad 
activities. 195 Once trained these members were incorporated into the KwaZulu Police 
Force and charged with the training of Inkatha Protection Units, which became 
Inkatha's paramilitary wing. This was probably one of the most effective internal COIN 
tactics of all, as these units and hit-squads directly fought the ANC in their own 
communities and settiements. 196 
The SADF embraced the imperial approach both externally and internally. It used and 
created indigenous and proxy forces to counter the insurgencies which it faced, 
191J By July 1975. civil war had become a reality in Angola as UN ITA. the MPLA and the FNLA vied for 
control of the country. The SADF crossed the border in August. However. when the South Africans 
withdrew in March 1976. the MPLA was able to achieve an apparent victory. This eliminated the FNLA 
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became the primary targets. bridges and power stations were blown up. and schools and clinics destroyed. 
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fostering insurgency to conduct COIN, making use of local peoples to provide 
information on the conflict and the terrain, and to compromise for its lack of manpower. 
This contra-mobilization of forces was central to the SADF's ability to deflect the 
insurgencies. Thus limited human resources, led the SADF to learn the most enduring 
and effective of all COIN methods. 
2.2.2.4. Culture 
The SA military has a rich and diverse history reflecting a variety of themes, cultures, 
traditions, organizational features and combat experiences. 197 These have been 
recorded in innumerable regimental and campaign histories, historical studies, and 
biographies. The SADF itself, was born primarily out of the British imperial tradition, 
however, similarly had roots in the Afrikaner civil-military tradition, or more specifically, 
the Boer commando system. 1g8 This varied past involving commando-styled irregular 
warfare, colonial policing, and a distinct British military influence in structure and 
sentiment, resulted in a military with the right attitudes, conventions and valued 
principles to learn COIN. 
The creation of the UDF in 1912, reflected the bringing together of various different 
military formations under the British model. However, the history of the SA military 
preceded the British by 150 years, during which various concepts were developed 
" ... within the local context of white settler defence to form a foundation of ideas and 
practices upon which British militarism was to build ... ,,199 Most notable was the 
commando which emphasized irregular military action carried out by the citizen-soldier. 
This emerged from the tradition of all white citizens having to bear arms to assist in 
defence of the Cape and on border regions.2oo Whereas the British model of a small, 
standing professional force emphasized the deployment of diSCiplined formations with 
heavy firepower, the commando focused on the use of small, lightly armed, mobile 
units. The commandos likewise fought as subsidiary parts of the British Army during 
the 19th century, in which their mobile, light-infantry tactics were widely influential. 
As such, the organizing values, standards and conventions which came to characterize 
the SADF were as a result of the exposure of local armed forces to the British tradition. 
The military did indeed undergo a period of Afrikanerization under the nationalists after 
1948, during which the military was remade in terms of personnel, inSignia, uniforms, 
197 Williams. "The Other Armies: Writing the History of MK." 22. 
198 Ibid: Frankel. Pretoria's Praetoriam·. Civil-Military Relations in South A.ji-ica. 19. 
199 Frankel. Pretoria's Pruetoriam·. Civi/-Militan' Relations in S'outh Aji'ica: 19. 











and the renaming of regiments. 201 However, the history of the SA military remained as 
one primarily defined by colonial policing roles shaped within a wider imperial military 
tradition. A tradition characterized by a sense of purpose and mission that went beyond 
the defence of national sovereignty, and included the aiding, subduing and policing of 
others beyond national borders. 
Both the imperial British and unconventional commando traditions engendered 
favourable attitudes towards adaptability, flexibility and innovativeness. Consequently, 
when the SADF came to be faced with several insurgent enemies simultaneously, it 
was willing to learn, adopt methods from others and manipulate them to suit its specific 
circumstances. It had developed a culture, however haphazardly, which was open to 
adaptation. 
Therefore, the SADF exhibited a culture which valued adaptability. It had been fostered 
through various traditions characterized by cultures which value improvisation and 
flexibility. Consequently, the culture of the SADF was open to adaptation and to 
learning COIN. 
2.2.3. Conclusion 
The SADF was essentially pragmatic in its approach to conducting COIN. While theory 
was produced it was largely discounted, and what was used was done so selectively. 
Instead the military relied on practice. This reliance was determined by its formative 
experiences with COIN in Namibia, its decentralized elite and commando structures, 
limited access to resources, use of proxy forces, and an inherited value of adaptability. 
These conditions informed the SADF's pragmatism, and thereby aided in the military 
learning COIN. 
2.3. CONCLUSION 
Factors determining whether a military is able to learn COIN include a political 
environment in which the ruling colonial or minority power faces a crisis of legitimacy, 
and in which this crisis takes the form of insurgency. Similarly, the respective military is 
required to be pragmatic in its approach to COIN. During the 1970s and 1980s, South 
Africa exhibited both. 
The white minority-ruled Apartheid state faced an intensifying crisis of legitimacy from 
the 1960s. It was challenged through insurgency both within South Africa and Namibia. 
2IJI Seegers. The Militw)" in the Making olModern South Africa. 8-9 and 94-95: Frankel. Pretoria's 











The crisis was understood as a total onslaught on the state, and the SADF assigned 
the task of eliminating it. The insurgencies faced by the SADF involved multiple actors 
in both rural and urban environments. These actors included SWAPO in Namibia, and 
primarily the ANC in South Africa. The former fought a rural guerrilla struggle, and the 
latter a struggle characterized by both rural and urban action. Both insurgencies 
remained limited up until the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
After independence, both insurgency and COIN overflowed into these and other 
neighbouring states. As such, the political environment in which the military had to 
learn COIN was favourable for doing so. 
The SA military was simultaneously pragmatic in its approach. While developing COIN 
theory, the SADF had a habit of discounting it, and considered its application to be 
dependent on specific circumstances. Instead the military relied on practice. This 
reliance was rooted in the SADF's formative experiences in Namibia, and decentralized 
structures and elite units that led the COIN campaign. Resources were likewise few 
and the SADF had to make do with less, particularly with regards to human resources. 
A reliance on conscripts had resulted in an inability to withstand attrition, and in the 
military embracing the imperial method of COIN in its contra-mobilization of allied and 
proxy forces. Finally, the SADF had inherited a culture of amalgamated imperial and 
unconventional military traditions, open to adaptation and learning COIN. 
Therefore, pragmatism and a crisis of legitimacy expressed through insurgency in the 
minority-ruled Apartheid state, allowed the SADF to learn COIN during the 1970s and 
1980s. Knowledge gained was rich and diverse, and reflected a unique experience 











CHAPTER THREE: THE SANDF: CONTINUING COIN 
In a political environment defined by transition, and pragmatism within the military 
ambiguous, the future of COIN knowledge within the SANDF remains unclear. This 
chapter will consider to what extent COIN knowledge has been kept and continued by 
the SA military post 1994. It will first consider the political environment in which the 
military now finds itself, and then any pragmatism currently exhibited by the SANDF in 
terms of COIN theory and practice. 
3.1. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: TRANSITION 
Apartheid formally ended in 1994. The unbanning of the ANC and the release of 
Nelson Mandela in 1990 signalled the beginning of the transition. Negotiations soon got 
underway, determining that a new military was to be formed. Insurgents were 
integrated with the SADF, and new policies embraced a conventional approach, 
structuring the military in terms of function, posture and force design. The new SANDF 
was thus legitimised, and was soon being called to participate in PSOs. While the 
government resisted early pressure to become involved, persistent security concerns 
have resulted in the SANDF participating in PSOs throughout Africa. Nevertheless, the 
transition environment has not been favourable to continuing COIN, and has been fairly 
hostile to general offensive capabilities. 
3.1.1. Transition & the Military 
3.1.1.1. Negotiations & Navigations 
"The future of the military lies at the heart of South Africa's transition.,,202 As an enforcer 
of Apartheid, the military was considered key to ensuring a successful negotiated 
settlement. 
Despite elements of the military being involved in third force violence, the SADF 
remained a coherent organization throughout the negotiation process. I n this, " ... it was 
the senior officers whose views counted most.,,203 While they may have been 
nationalists, few wanted to derail the process. Instead, it was considered more 
important to secure a suitable settlement for the military within a future South Africa. 
The generals adopted a low political profile, characterized by rare, yet politically shrewd 
statements regarding how the military would serve the government of the day, and was 
an apolitical, professional force. By the end of 1992 the military signalled their 
~o~ Shaw. "Biting the Bullet. Negotiating Democracy's Defence .. ' 228. 











willingness to accept a settlement, and in April 1993, MK and the SADF met formally to 
begin negotiations on the future of the military.204 
Both the SADF and MK agreed that the new military would embrace a posture of an 
apolitical defensive force charged with the protection of national sovereignty.205 
Statutory and non-statutory forces were to be integrated, with the new military 
comprising a core professional force and part-time reserves. SADF standards and 
values would be maintained, and the multi-party, parliamentary JSCD would be 
established to review legislation, expenditure and authorize decisions relating to 
weapons procurement, doctrine and deployment.206 
The military further navigated itself through the TRC, emerging less tainted than that of 
the police207 Again the generals acted shrewdly, and when it came to the military's 
formal submission, they failed to admit to any wrongdoing and whitewashed all dark 
deeds.208 However, unlike the police, the military was able to better deny their role in 
COIN, and had better negotiated a soft line on prosecution in exchange for support for 
the new government. 209 
Thus throughout the negotiation process the military continued to be considered a force 
to be reckoned with and a critical player to have on board for the success of both the 
process and the future government. Despite its actions during Apartheid, the military 
was able to navigate its way through the transition, and acquire a legitimacy in its 
preparedness to transform. 
3.1.1.2. Consequences: Taming the Juggernaut 
The SAN OF is " ... a creature that was born of compromise ... ,,210 and came into being at 
midnight on 26 April 1994. The military now began a complex process of integration 
and transformation. Notable changes to the posture, function and design of the military 
were determined in the 1996 Constitution, the 1996 White Paper on Defence, and the 
20~ Such statements were important as a professional force unconcerned with political affairs was unlikely 
to mount a coup. Ibid .. 291-294; Seegers. The Military in Ihe Making olModern SOlllh Afi-ica. 271-272. 
20S Philip Frankel. Soldiers in a Storm. The Armed Forces in SOllth Afi-ica '.I' Democratic Transition 
(United States of America: Westview Press, 2000). 28. 
206 Ibid. 40; Shaw. "Biting the Bullet. Negotiating Democracy's Defence." 248-249; Gavin Cawthra. 
"Security Governance in South Africa." African SeCUri(l' Review 14 (2005): 97: Cawthra. Securing Sowh 
"i/!-ica '.I' Democracl·. Defence, Development and Security in Transition, 63. 
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20g Antjie Krog. COllnfl:l' ()lA~l' Skull. 2nd ed. (South Africa: Random House (Pty) Ltd. 2002). 57: Alex 
Boraine. A Counlry Unmasked (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000). 168. 
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1998 Defence Review. These documents are the basis on which the SANDF has been 
developed. However, they have not been without criticism, and are under review. 211 
3.1.1.2.1. Function & Posture 
The Constitution states that: "The primary object of the defence force is to defend and 
protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the 
Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.,,212 As 
such, it determines that the SANDF may be employed in the defence of the Republic, 
in cooperation with the police, or in fulfilment of an international obligation. 213 From this 
came the White Paper, the overarching policy framework for the SANDF. The paper 
determined that the primary function of the SANDF is to defend against external 
military aggression, with secondary functions including border protection, support for 
the police, and PSOS.214 
The SANDF holds an overall defensive posture. It embraces the concept of non-
offensive defence, a conventional approach to defence which renounces strategic 
offensive capabilities, and calls for a reduction in force levels and pre-emptive strike 
capability.215 However, the SANDF does not follow a purist form. On the operational 
level, provision is made for rolling back offensive actions, necessitating offensive 
capabilities. While this posture is considered key in allowing the SANDF to participate 
in collective security structures, it is considered necessary to do so without 
undermining capabilities that provide" ... the ability to operate in a tactically offensive 
manner.,,216 South Africa thus takes a counter-force approach, deterrence that 
threatens to destroy enemy capabilities. 217 
This emphasis on conventional, non-offensive defence emerged out of the desire for a 
non-partisan, professional military, uninvolved in domestic affairs. In this, the influence 
of anti-militarist academics pushed towards a staunch conventional posture and 
"II DOD. Annual Report 200-112005 (South Africa: Department of Defence. 2005). 3-4. 
http: \\'\\\\ .dod.m i 1.7a documents!annua Ire ports ' An ual Repol12U05 ,pdf. 
"I" The Constitution o/the Repuhlic o/Sollth A/rica, 1996. Chapter I I. para. 200(2). 
2" Ibid .. Chapter I I. para. 201(2). 
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J 996 (South Africa: Department of Defence, 1996). 
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215 Offensiveness is considered to be derived from the structure ofa military. military structures and 
capabilities must be defensive and non-threatening to other nations. Evert Jordaan and Abel Esterhuyse. 
"South African Defence Since 1994. The Influence of Non-Offensive Defence." Afj'ican Security Review 
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Transition. 157. 
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negative attitude towards offensive capabilities 218 There likewise existed the belief that 
the end of Apartheid would bring an end to conflict in Africa. As a result, little 
consideration was given to the likes of PSOs in terms of structures, training and 
equipment required by the army.219 
However, as part of a recent draft Defence Update, defend and protect are to entail 
conventional warfare and participation in PSOs. It has likewise been proposed that 
instead of primary and secondary functions, functions will be conceptualized as part of 
a series of objectives, for example, to defend and protect the sovereignty of the 
Republic, and to promote regional and continental security. The achievement of these 
will be through a missions-based approach by which objectives will be divided into a 
grouping of missions, allowing for the SANDF to prepare for all missions instead of 
merely a primary function. 22o 
3.1.1.2.2. Design 
The 1998 Defence Review outlined clearer policies with regards to force design 
determined by the primary function. 221 As no significant role in PSOs was foreseen, the 
only logical design was considered to be one against external aggression. 222 
The army is designed around a core conventional capability comprised of a small 
permanent force and large reserve force. Secondary functions are executed using the 
collateral utility available in this design. 223 The force design itself constitutes a 
mechanised, parachute, motorised, light and special infantry; armour and armoured 
reconnaissance; artillery and air defence artillery; intelligence; logistic and engineer 
support capabilities. 224 The review likewise commits the military to PSOs, including 
218 Shaw. "Biting the Bullet. Negotiating Democracy's Defence." 233: Mark Shaw. "Negotiating Defence 
for a New South Africa:' in About Turn. The Transfi)rmation ojthe South Afi'ican Afilitwy and 
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peacekeeping and peace enforcement, however, fails to address these in any depth.225 
Consequently, the army's force design is" ... predicated on short logistic lines for highly 
mechanised mobile forces prepared to fight in defence of the territorial integrity of the 
country and not for out-of-area force projection and support in distant places.,,226 
However, a need for revision of standing policies has been recognized within the DOD. 
Force design is considered to be in need of adjustment in order to meet the needs of 
current tasks.227 It will continue to be structured according to the core force design so 
as to be able to meet conventional threats, however, with an emphasis on PSOs in 
training, out-of-area force projection and support requirements in distant places. 
3.1.2. National Security 
Since 1998, a clearer understanding has emerged with regards to the security threats 
facing the nation, and the policy and actions required to meet these threats. A part of 
which is South Africa's growing prominence in PSOs on the continent. 
National security in South Africa is characterized by a broad understanding of security. 
Security is understood not merely in military terms, but simultaneously recognizes non-
military dimensions, with a focus on the security of people. 228 Internationally, policy 
objectives include the promotion of regional security in Southern Africa. Instability in the 
region is understood to impact negatively on neighbouring states through refugees, 
cross-border trafficking, disease and environmental destruction.229 South Africa is 
likewise considered to share a common destiny with Southern Africa and that 
"Domestic [South African] peace and stability will not be achieved in a context of 
regional instability and poverty.,,230 In turn, as South Africa's security is linked to that of 
its neighbours, it is in South Africa's national interest to avoid conflicts in the region. 231 
This position became integrated with the overarching foreign policy for an African 
Renaissance, the bringing of peace and prosperity to Africa through political, social and 
economic reform and development. The concept of African Renaissance informs and 
c25 Cawthra. "Security Governance in South Africa," 97. 
c26 Le Roux. "The Post-Apartheid South African Military: Transforming with the Nation," 261. 
227 Major General Jan Lusse, telephonic interview by author, Cape Town/Pretoria. 12 September 2005: 
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Town. 8 April 2005. http:!\\w\\.in/().gov.za /sp.:cch.:s!20050504111615 1 00 1 .hlm. 
228 DOD. "Defence Update 2005." chapter 2, (3)-(4). 
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animates security policy. In turn, South Africa plays a leading role in the AU, a key arm 
of which is the ASF. 232 The ASF is intended to comprise five regional brigades with a 
capacity to operate within a variety of scenarios, including intervention and complex 
multidimensional missions involving low level spoilers.233 South Africa has further 
played a role in the development of the SAOCBRIG, the regional brigade of the ASF. 
Participation in PSOs has thus become a priority of the nation's security policy, with the 
SANOF acquiring the responsibility of assisting in creating peace and stability in Africa 
through PSOS.234 Currently, the SANOF is deployed in various PSOs on the continent, 
most notably in the ORC and Burundi. 235 These PSOs are largely being conducted in 
insurgent conflicts characterized by: weak governance; state failure; a lack of consent 
for PSOs; and lightly armed multiple militia or warlord groups, with no reliance on 
technologically advanced equipment, fighting both the government and each other, and 
particularly in regions where state authority has yet to be extended.236 For example, the 
ORC. 237 (see Appendix B). It can further be assumed that such PSOs will be expanded 
as part of future missions under SAOCBRIG. Given South Africa's economic and 
military strength within the region, the SANOF will most likely shoulder the 
responsibility for such operations. 238 
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However, bringing about peace in insurgent conflicts is not easy. While having been so 
far engaged largely in logistical activities, PSO deployments have raised questions as 
to whether the SANDF is in fact adequately trained and structured for the spectrum of 
tasks involved in such conflict environments. 239 For example, PSOs have highlighted 
the need for operationally minded, flexible soldiers who are technically and tactically 
proficient, and well versed in strategy, history, and the politics of Africa. 240 There is 
likewise a need for greater leadership training at a lower level of responsibility to 
encourage improvisation and ensure that officers have the skills to make critical 
decisions in volatile situations in remote areas relatively independent of direct 
supervision. 241 That they are able to think beyond the battlefield in ambiguous 
circumstances, from violations at checkpoints, to ambushes on patrols, to engaging in 
combat with warlords. 242 There is a further need for better intelligence to build a more 
accurate picture of the operational situation in the mission area, in order to assist the 
military in retaining the initiative and remain one step ahead of the likes of warlords 
through appropriate actions, and not simply maintain a reactive presence in the field. 243 
Thus national security policy has necessitated greater participation in PSOs, and PSOs 
have risen in profile as a role for the SANDF. However, given the nature of many 
African conflicts, this role is and will most likely be conducted in insurgent conflicts, an 
operational environment which is necessitating certain skills and capacities within the 
army, or more specifically, COIN skills and capacities. 
3.1.3. Conclusion 
South Africa's transition to democracy began in 1990. Negotiations with regards to the 
future of the military played a central role in the transition, and as a result, insurgents 
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were integrated with former counterinsurgents to form the SANDF. However, policies 
and hostility towards offensive capabilities saw the military taking on a staunchly 
conventional approach in terms of posture, function and design. Importantly, this 
approach has not favoured the continuation of COIN. However, the need to meet 
security threats has resulted in the SANDF becoming increasingly engaged in PSOs in 
insurgent conflicts, with these deployments highlighting the need for COIN skills within 
the army. Thus, while the transition has boded poorly for COIN, increasing participation 
in such PSOs is necessitating an environment conducive to keeping COIN knowledge. 
3.2. PRAGMATISM 
The transition resulted in a break with COIN within the military. A political environment 
hostile to the crimes of COIN resulted in distrust of the military. The military, however, 
reacted pragmatically. Eager to portray itself as a professional force, the SANDF 
effectively turned away from COIN. It threw itself into its new role of external peace 
force, and did so within this anti-COIN framework. This was furthered by the new 
army's negative experiences alongside the police and in an intervention-styled PSO in 
Lesotho. Nevertheless, resources continue to be in short supply and specialist 
structures continue to train in COIN. However, the commandos (an internal COIN 
force) and deployments in support of the police are being phased out. Wider COIN 
training is virtually non-existent, and emerging culture ambiguous in its value of 
adaptability. While the military showed itself willing to adapt to democracy, it 
simultaneously developed a distaste for COIN. 
3.2.1. Non Theory 
From 1991, MK, a revolutionary army, re-orientated itself as a more professional force 
in order to better prepare for the hierarchical bureaucracy that was the SADF.244 
However, given the difference in number and the prevailing SADF leadership, 
integration amounted to absorption. Instead of integrating people and ideas, insurgents 
were merely absorbed into the bureaucracy, ensuring that SADF culture, doctrine and 
structures formed the basis of the SANDF.245 However, there was a discontinuation 
with COIN. Associated with the abuses of Apartheid, the SADF COIN experience 
became taboo, and COIN considered indicative of what the new SANDF was not to 
reflect. Scattered with individuals who had been required to be flexible and innovative, 
244 Clearer rank structures were introduced and leaders turned to countries with a British military history 
for training to enhance conventional skills. Namely, Zimbabwe and India. Seegers, The Military in the 
Making of Modern South Africa, 277; Shaw, 232. 
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either out of necessity or because they were trained to be so, there has been no effort 
to capture their knowledge of insurgent and COIN warfare for future reference. 246 
The position of the SANDF is that it no longer thinks about COIN.247 In 1994, the COIN 
doctrine of the military was effectively frozen. While SADF COIN manuals were 
reformatted into pamphlets and updated until 1998,248 they have not been revised 
since, and there is no intention of doing so in the future. The reason given is that the 
Constitution and the Defence Act do not cater for such activities. 249 COIN is considered 
to be offensive and abusive, and a method of warfare conducted internally rather than 
possibly externally. With the lack of an insurgent threat, this has resulted in COIN being 
considered irrelevant to the future of the SANDF. Thus, the SANDF does not have a 
current COIN theory, no up to date ideas, informing principles or guidelines for 
conducting COIN. 
That said, insurgency and COIN continue to be taught as forms of historical warfare, 
and are done so through courses in military history and strategy at the Military 
Academy. Here, insurgency is understood traditionally: a group conducts irregular 
warfare, including terror and sabotage, to overthrow a government. While it is a 
creature that comes in various forms, with changing strategies and goals, the 
fundamental characteristics of insurgency remain the same. Covering traditional theory, 
the academy considers rural and urban revolutionary guerrilla warfare, terrorism, 
revolution and insurgency in Africa. COIN is similarly traditionally understood, with 
reference to classic theorists (notably, Beaufre and McCuen), and in terms of military, 
political, economic, psychological actions taken to defeat insurgency.25o Emphasis is 
placed on insurgency and COIN in Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and South 
Africa. Insurgency in the DRC is likewise covered with the SANDF's PSOs in Africa, 
and the nature and challenges of such operations. 251 In this, there appears to be a 
theoretical link within military academia regarding a connection between insurgency, 
COIN and PSOs. However, this coverage is scant in comparison to that of conventional 
military history and strategy.252 Moreover, relatively few graduates in fact follow careers 
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in the military.253 Consequently, the vast majority of soldiers will not have been exposed 
to these concepts and ideas. 
The 2002 Military Strategy likewise discusses unconventional and non-conventional 
onslaughts, and operations and actions to counter them as possible missions.254 The 
document reflects concepts, ideas and theorists of the past, namely, onslaught and 
8eaufre. 255 Importantly, the missions-based approach discussed as part of possible 
revisions to defence policy has precedence in the Military Strategy.256 All missions are 
required to be structured around the three strategic objectives: (i) defence against 
aggression; (ii) promoting security; and (iii) and supporting the people of South Africa. 
The first has since been rephrased as to enhance and maintain comprehensive 
defence capabilities, which amounts to defence" ... against any external threat of 
aggression ... ,,257 Possible missions include:258 
show of force 
pre-emptive operations 
(an attack initiated on the belief that an enemy attack is imminent or 
under way) 
repelling conventional onslaught 
repelling unconventional onslaught 
(operations conducted against guerrilla or paramilitary groupings) 
repelling non-conventional onslaught 
(operations to curb attacks by a-national, sub-national or meta-national 
forces either within or outside of South Africa, for example, religious 
fundamentalists, warlords, pirates, or groups trafficking in illicit drugs, 
weapons and/or people) 
defence against biological and/or chemical onslaught 
special operations 
the protection of foreign assets 
"M il itary Strategy 314 Contemporary Thought on Low-Intensity Conflict," in Faculty o{ Military Science 
Calendar 2()05. Part 13 (South Africa: Stellenbosch University. 2005). 29 and 33. 
c5J Esterhuyse. interview by author. Cape Town. 7 July 2005. 
c5. DOD. Suuth Afi-ican National De{ence Force Milita/)" Strategy (South Africa: Department of Defence. 
2002). 5. http: \\\\ \\.111 il.zaCSA N OF CorporatcStatliStrateg\ 8: Planl1il1~ M iiStratcQ\ .pel f. 
c55 Beaufre adorns the document with an opening quote: .. The essential Milita/)' Dilemma: In effect, the 
most dillicult military prohlem to resolve is that o{estahlishing a security ,Iystem, as inexpensive as 
possible in time u{peace, capable o{transforming itsel{very rapidly into a pOlfe/jidfcJrce in case olthe 
danger o{aggression. .. Andre Beaufre, as quoted in DOD. Suuth Afi-ican /\'atiunal Defence Force 
A1ilitm)' Strategy. I. 
~~~ DOD. South Afi-ican Natiunal D.e{ence Furce Milita/)" Strategy. 
-. DOD. Annual Repurt 20()-I!200) , 6. 
c58 DOD. South Afi-ican National Defence Force Military Strategy. 4-5: Department of Defence. Strategic 
Business Plan FY2005106 to FY 2007/08 (South Africa: Department of Defence. 2005). 10. 











While the SANDF may not think about COIN, its key strategy document reflects and 
suggests a necessity for counter-guerrilla or COIN operations, including possible 
missions against both classic and contemporary forms of insurgency. Moreover, the 
second objective, has been revised to to promote peace, security and stability in the 
region and on the continent, and involves external deployment or support to enhance 
security. Possible missions include peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
operations. 259 Importantly, an emphasis is to be placed on the first objective, with the 
second remaining at the same intensity, and the third to decline over time. The strategy 
further emphasizes the need for flexibility being that the context is one characterized by 
uncertainty and unpredictability.26o 
The draft Defence Update likewise focuses on non-traditional security threats, non-
state actors and non-conventional methods of insecurity and instability. As per the 
update, insecurity emanates from weak and failed states, bad governance, the 
politicisation of ethnicity, and the armed competition for scarce and strategic 
resources. 261 However, while it is recognized that policy needs to be reviewed,262 COIN 
does not feature as part of a possible solution, as a means of countering guerrillas, 
paramilitaries, cartels or warlords. There has been no COIN theory produced to guide 
action in response to these threats. 
Therefore, although limited and articulated in a different language and for a different 
purpose, there is some continuation of former COIN theory in concepts, informing 
theorists and the emphasis on a need for flexibility. However, without amounting to a 
clear doctrine for COIN, of how to counter insurgent threats whether of a classic or 
contemporary form. The military is thinking about COIN, however, only really on an 
academic historical level. While the academics may be exploring a connection between 
insurgency, COIN and PSOs, the connection appears to be considered insignificant to 
warrant a greater study or alter policy. 
With regards to the development of ideas, the SANDF has become somewhat 
stagnant. Instead of constantly revising doctrine, the SANDF has exhibited a lack of 
productivity over the last few years among instructors at its various training colleges -
those charged with doctrine development. It was argued by one source, that these 
institutions have become dumping grounds for officers who are not deployable due to 
c59 DOD. South African National Defence Force Militmy Strategy. 4 and 6: Department of Defence. 
Strategic Business Plan FY2005106 to FY 2007108, 10; This objective likewise includes the support for 
military foreign relations and the defence against information onslaught. 
260 DOD. Strategic Business Plan FY2005106 to FY 2007108. 10-1 I. 
c61 DOD. "Defence Update 2005," chapter 1. (I). (8)-(9). 











HIV/AIDS. Although this claim could not be verified, if accurate, instructors have either 
limited or no combat or PSO experience, resulting in progressively poorer quality of 
training and doctrine development. 263 
3.2.2. Practice 
The continuing of COIN by the SANDF has been influenced primarily by its initial 
negative experiences. Despite limited resources and COIN knowledge being 
maintained through specialist structures, wider COIN training is negligible. While the 
SANDF has exhibited an openness to adaptation to its new democratic environment, its 
value of adaptation is questionable in light of its reluctance to continue COIN. 
3.2.2.1. Formative Experiences 
The formative experiences of the SANDF have not proven favourable to maintaining 
COIN knowledge, and what might have been positive experiences in the past, are now 
condemned and considered to be that which must never to be repeated. 
In an atmosphere distrustful of the military, the first experience of the SANDF was 
domestic deployment. Since before 1994, the military has been deployed internally in 
support of the police. Now restricted to a backup rather than a paramilitary role, these 
deployments persist to aid in conducting police operations on and within South Africa's 
borders to combat crime. 264 However, particularly in early deployments, the military was 
accused of heavy handedness in terms of levels of force used and abuse. Along with 
criticisms of having been too involved internally in the past, and the SANDF wanting to 
portray itself as a democratic, professional institution, the military developed a distaste 
for these deployments. This was furthered by the political reluctance towards the use of 
the military in such roles. As early as the White Paper, it was noted that these roles 
were unfavourable and were eventually to be phased OUt. 265 While the SANDF has 
begun to disengage from such operations, deployment is likely to continue given the 
insufficient capacity of the police to address crime. Importantly, the experience has 
been considered unfavourable by the SANDF and counter to its core business. 
Second was the SANDF's external deployment into Lesotho in Operation Boleas, in 
September 1998. Despite achieving the goals of the mission, the SANDF's first PSO 
c(" Confidential source. interview by author. 2005. 
:6~ Frankel. Soldiers in a Storm. The Armed Forces in South Af;'ica 's Democratic Transition. 159-160; 
For example. an average of 3000 soldiers were deployed in border control and rural protection operations 
continuously in 2004 alone. Le Roux. 'The Post-Apartheid South African Military: Transforming with 
the Nation," 263. 
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was hailed as smacking too much of SADF interventionism. The operation was 
launched under SADC to quash an army rebellion in Lesotho, and despite having 
restored stability after several days of skirmishes and looting, the operation is 
considered to have been plagued by tactical shortcomings, poor intelligence and 
communication. 266 However, the debacle had two results. (i) It prompted the writing of 
the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace missions. The 
paper assigned responsibility for participation to the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
aligned South African PSO principles with those of the UN, and provides for both 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. 267 (ii) Boleas impacted on the types of 
PSOs the military is willing to conduct. Offensive intervention-type operations against 
uprisings, militias and rebels are out; passive, classic peacekeeping operations 
involving manning checkpoints and conducting patrols are in. Even when deployed in 
the former type of operation in the DRC, the SANDF has focused on the latter in terms 
of the activities in which it participates and the training it carries out. 
Therefore, neither of these experiences favoured the maintaining of COIN knowledge. 
Internal policing activities, border and area protection involving COIN skills are frowned 
upon both within and without the SANDF, and external operations are limited to more 
passive COIN-like activities. Overall, pressure to transform in light of its past, has 
resulted in a military reluctant to dabble in offensive actions, particularly COIN actions. 
3.2.2.2. Structure 
In terms of insurgency and COIN, the military suffered an exodus of talent and 
experience. Many MK leaders opted to pursue political and commercial careers. 268 As a 
result key leaders did not join or soon left, their knowledge of insurgency left untapped. 
Many SADF personnel involved in the COIN wars are likewise no longer serving 
soldiers. Considered to have blood on their hands, many resigned leaving those 
involved in the later more conventional war in Angola behind. 269 Again, their knowledge 
of waging multiple COIN wars has not been accessed. Thus, whether SADF or MK, 
elites and their knowledge were lost in the transition. 
e66 Hurriedly planned and executed, SANDF personnel were too few in number and poorly prepared to 
respond to the unrest. Eight SANDF personnel were killed, much of Maseru was destroyed, and up to 100 
civilians were either killed or injured. Shelton, "The South African National Defence Force and President 
Mbeki's Peace and Security Agenda: New Roles and Mission," 39-40: Roger Southall, "SADCs 
Intervention into Lesotho: an Illegal Defence of Democracy?" in Afi'ican interrent ionist States, (eds.) 
Oliver Furley and Roy May (England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 200 I), 158, 164-166: Noel Stott. "From 
the SADF to the SANDF: Safeguarding South Africa for a better life for all?" /'io/ence and Transition 7 
(2002):llI1r:\\\\\\,~>YL.Qrg.!,tpgPGrc'iWLtp"JpLblrn: Kent and Malan, "Decisions, Decisions. South 
Africa's Foray into Regional Peace Operations," 4. 
e67 Department of Foreign Affairs, 6-7. 
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The position of the military is that the SANDF no longer prepares for COIN.27o Most of 
the structures that were at the forefront of COIN were disbanded during the transition. 
The military no longer wishes to have any part in COIN activities, and instead is 
focusing on its external role in Africa. 271 While there continues to be elite structures 
which train in COIN, COIN is not considered to be a method of warfare required 
generally by the SANDF. 
3.2.2.2.1. Specialists 
The SANDF is one force comprised of both permanent and part-time (reserve) forces. 
While there are some units which train in COIN, the majority of soldiers do not. Also, 
the SANDF is strictly a volunteer force and no longer includes conscripts. 
The SANDF consists overwhelmingly of conventionally trained forces. As part of these, 
there exists a Rapid Deployment Force comprised of a mechanised infantry brigade, 
parachute brigade and special forces brigade. This force is trained to carry out 
specialised tasks, maintain immediate readiness and constitute the basis of a 
conventional, highly mobile landward defence.272 The conventional reserves are 
intended to constitute the backbone of the military's capabilities, and are characterized 
by a " ... strong regimental tradition, based on accumulated history and battle 
experience ... ,,273 The territorial forces, comprised of light infantry battalions and Area 
Defence Commando Units, are charged with the protection of interior assets and 
landward borders, and are the forces primarily involved in supporting the police. 274 
As prior to 1994, the commandos are trained in COIN, and provide the bulk of the 
SANDF's rear area defence" ... where their knowledge of local terrain, their self-
sufficiency potential, and the existence of more tightly-knit community networks renders 
them effective in a variety of roles.,,275 With the advantage of local personnel, roles 
include a light infantry and guerrilla capacity, reconnaissance and tactical intelligence 
functions. Each commando has two sub-structures, area bound units and non-area 
bound units. The former gathers information and intelligence, and has a rapid response 
270 de WaaL telephone conversation with author. Cape Town/Pretoria. 9 December 2005. 
271 Ibid. 
272 DOD. SOl/th Af;'ican Delence Review 1998 (South Africa: Department of Defence. 1998). 
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Shelton and Chris Alden. "Brave New World: The Transformation of the South African Military." 
Comparatire Strategy 17 (1998): 353. 
273 Williams. "Completing the Defence Transformation Process: The Transformation of the South African 
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capacity. These units are divided into geographically determined cells and platoons, 
and are the eyes and ears of the commando. 276 The non-area bound units act as an 
auxiliary force to the police, and are not permitted to work independently of the police. 
Assisting the police in crime prevention operations, they act as force multipliers, and 
participate in manning observation posts, patrols, roadblocks, vehicle check points, and 
cordon-and-search operations. However, they do not have powers of apprehension or 
arrest, may secure roadblocks but not search vehicles, and may cordon but not 
search.277 Notably, the commandos were withdrawn from urban operations in 2001, 
and currently operate in rural districts rather than in towns or residential areas. 
Despite continued participation in these operations, the SANDF recently began to 
phase out the commando system, with members being incorporated within the 
conventional reserve force and the police reservist system. The process is intended to 
be completed by 2009, and is considered to be indicative of the military's reluctance to 
be involved in internal security and its disinterest in COIN as a task 278 However, it is 
argued that this will result in a strategic gap in the force design of the SANDF, and 
particularly in rear area protection. Security threats to both the nation and region come 
from the likes of terrorism and organized crime. The commandos are designed to 
provide early warning and quick reaction to such threats. 279 As they stand, the 
commandos continue to participate in border and rural protection, while being phased 
out according to levels of commando activity.280 Importantly, incorporation into the 
conventional reserves has been on a voluntary basis. Many members, however, have 
opted not to join, resulting in the capacities and skills inherent in the system being lost. 
Post-1994, the light infantry capability within the army structure effectively replaced the 
COIN capability of the SADF. The light infantry battalions were to provide an 
unconventional capability within a conventional arena, and conduct unconventional 
actions and operations against regular and irregular forces. Such operations would 
include the establishment and protection of bases, protection of local civilians, search 
and destroy operations, urban and rural patrols, escorts, and cordon-and-search 
operations. While little information is available on the battalions and their operations, 
the provision of a need for a light infantry capability within the Military Strategy seems 
to have entrenched the future of the battalions and their function. That is, the strategic 
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objectives are intended to be achieved through various capabilities, including, a light 
mobile capability involving" ... personnel and material prepared and sustained to 
participate in operations where agility, flexibility and limited fire power are required ... ,,281 
The Special Forces Brigade likewise continues to practice COIN, and remains the 
backbone of the SANDF's COIN capability. While the future of the special forces was 
initially in doubt, the need for an operational capability in PSOs ensured their 
continuation 282 At present, the brigade is faced with an increase in commitments, so 
much so that a contingency fund for PSOs was to be discussed at the end of 2005.283 
As it stands, the brigade is an amalgamation of the Recces. It was formally established 
in 1996, and includes two combat regiments: 4 Special Forces Regiment and 5 Special 
Forces Regiment. 284 The brigade is considered a strategic force and conducts 
operations internally and externally, in peace and war, in accordance with the Military 
Strategy.285 It is tasked with strategic reconnaissance and intelligence collection, 
support to PSOs, counter-terror actions, offensive actions, combat search and rescue, 
and rural and urban guerrilla warfare. 286 The brigade's trademark continues to be long-
term deployment of small teams over vast distances in the African bush,287 and despite 
having been subject to under funding since 1994, continues to be described as one of 
the world's most respected units. 288 More recently, with a rise in operations, the brigade 
is set to see an average annual 11.8% increase in its budget,289 indicating the need for 
special forces skills and their renewed profile in the African battle space. 
281 DOD. South Ajj'ican National Defence Force Military Strategy. 10. 
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Therefore, COIN is being maintained through specialist operators. However, these 
operators are on the decline. Yet, the need for the Special Forces Brigade has 
seemingly never been greater. Tasks have remained similar, and as COIN manuals 
were never revised, the techniques used are the same as those used by the SADF.290 
3.2.2.2.2. Training 
The increasing bureaucratization of the SANDF has hindered the promotion of 
innovation, flexibility, and the adapting of established knowledge. There has been 
progressively less COIN training to accumulate experience, develop knowledge and 
ensure the ability of its members to collectively apply this knowledge to new 
challenges. 291 Neither the tactical experience of the SADF, nor former MK members 
who participated in various regional insurgencies, has been used to develop the 
military's COIN capabilities and tactics. 
Using the missions-based approach to achieve the strategic objectives, missions are 
intended to direct force preparation and employment during peacetime and conflict. 292 
Chief of the SA Army Lieutenant General Shoke has stated that the army is in need of 
" ... a combat ready, sustainable and flexible force that would be able to adapt to the 
ever-changing African battle space ... ,,293 However, given the lack of COIN practice, 
there is a disjuncture between such statements, the strategic objectives, and the 
training received by the army. 
COIN techniques which are more generally practised, are done so as part of wider 
training to unit level, however, only within set scenarios rather than as an overall 
method of warfare, and certainly not for COIN per se. 294 For example, scenarios 
involving terrorists, warlords or hostage situations. Such training is not commonplace. It 
is only carried out when a need arises, and then only completed as part of mission-
ready training prior to deployment. There is, however, an acknowledgement within the 
military that these skills should carry greater weight in training, and that while limited for 
the time being, the army is moving towards doing just that given its future roles. For this 
purpose, the army aims to follow a basic conventional design, yet to be a force that can 
do a/l things, a conventional but also flexible force. 295 
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There remains some COIN experience within the current infantry as many soldiers 
have been deployed in border protection and in support of the police. 296 However, as 
the SANDF withdraws from these operations, the learning of COIN skills is intended to 
be compensated for through skills being learned as part of PSO training. 297 This 
training is designed to meet the tasks required under UN and NATO peace doctrines, 
and outlined in preliminary draft documents of SANDF PSO doctrine (all utilised by the 
SANDF298).299 However, despite this semblance of COIN-like training, it is considered 
increasingly doubtful that the SANDF is capable of countering a direct insurgency.300 
That if jihad insurgency erupted in Southern Africa, or a right-wing insurgency emerged 
internally, the SANDF no longer has the skills or capacities to counter such a threat. 
Therefore, COIN knowledge is barely being maintained in wider training. COIN skills 
are intended to be compensated for in PSO training. However, this compensation is 
failing to take place in terms of providing the SANDF with the necessary skills to 
counter insurgency. 
3.2.2.3. Resources 
Democracy has brought new missions, tasks and roles, however, limited material and 
human resources continue to hinder the military's ability to meet these sufficiently. 
Instead, the SANDF has had to focus more generally on how to do more with less. 301 
Restrictive budgets since 1994, have eroded away the force potential and capacity of 
the military.302 While the budget has been increasing slightly from R 18 414 380 in 2002 
to R22 459432 in 2005, its inadequacy has hindered training, the development, 
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provision and maintenance of weapons systems and other logistical equipment. 303 
Provisions have likewise proven insufficient for development in line with PSOS.304 
The Defence Review noted a need for the military to be equipped with major weapons 
systems. 305 The result was the strategic defence package. While the package is in line 
with the review, the acquisitions have favoured the air force and navy rather than the 
army, yet it is the army (with ageing and obsolete equipment and weapons systems) 
which is at the forefront of PSOS.306 However, the army has neither made any specific 
demands, so whether it will be acquiring the necessary resources is likewise unclear. 
The package has further limited the budget to high expenditure on equipment, with the 
budget for force preparation and training being increasingly limited. 30? Army training is 
focused only on those forces being deployed externally, with regular infantry force 
training" ... in the form of retraining of the infantry solider at a dangerously low level due 
to financial constraints.,,308 Achievement of preparation objectives for light infantry 
capabilities has likewise been hampered in the limited acquisition of ammunition for 
main combat equipment. 309 
Limitations are equally dire with regards to human resources. The army continues to 
struggle with the number of soldiers it can deploy. This is accounted for by 
rationalization, resignations, low recruitment, and the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. 
Rationalization aimed at restructuring and improving representivity has decimated the 
military in terms of numbers, skills and experience. The SANDF is a fraction of the size 
it once was, with many individuals having resigned. Through integration, the total 
number of members within the SANDF was 93 324 in 1998. By 2005/2006 this was 71 
705, with the army at 31 499.310 However, despite recruitment increasing, numbers 
remain low in terms of requirements for foreign deployments. In turn, there is no 
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system for career path development related to foreign deployments, and instead 
soldiers merely volunteer to be deployed abroad. 
However, many within the army are neither deployable. Members inherited from the 
SADF and non-statutory forces are simply too old and unfit, and the high prevalency of 
HIV/AIDS within the army has limited the number of deployable soldiers. One source 
stated that infantry battalions are wrecked with HIV/AIDS,311 and Heinecken has 
reported that ''' ... the SANDF will not be able to deploy a homogenous battalion for a 
UN mission requiring HIV negative personnel at short notice.",312 With the effect of 
AIDS and rising infections, the number of deployable troops will be further reduced. 
Policy likewise prevents commanding officers from knowing the HIV status of soldiers 
prior to deployment, resulting in soldiers being trained for PSOs only to be removed 
before deployment,313 further straining resources available for training and preparation. 
Therefore, a meagre budget incompatible with the needs and roles of the SANDF, 
antiquated equipment and insufficient numbers of deployable soldiers continue to 
hinder the army's ability to perform its tasks as per conventional methods. 
3.2.2.4. Culture 
The SANDF's strategic culture is comprised of several forces and cultural histories.314 
The SADF had multiple histories all exhibiting a value of adaptation. The non-statutory 
insurgent forces by necessity were flexible and adaptable. The combination of these 
forces suggests that the SANDF should value adaptability. 
However, there has been a conscious moving away from the past and COIN.315 
Instead, the SANDF has focused on conventionalism, and selected discipline, loyalty, 
patriotism, human dignity, accountability and integrity to be valued. 316 Valued over 
adaptability. It has further been argued that the influence of political correctness, 
pacifism and a rights-based culture has required the military to conform to civilian 
values, and has led to a loss of a necessary aggressiveness within the military, for it to 
get the job done317 
,II Confidential source. interview by author. 2005. 
31e Heinecken. "Preparing for Operations Other Than War: How Equipped is the SANDF to Deal with 
'Soft Missions'')'' 72. 
m Ibid .. 84-86. 
m Brigadier General George Kruys (Ret.), "Some Major Factors Influencing Military Efficiency in the 
South African National Defence Force." Strategic Review/or SOllthern Ali'ica 26 (May 2004): 7. 
~15 Esterhuyse. interview with author. Cape Town. 7 July 2005 . 
. ,16 Lindy Heinecken. Lt Richard Gueli and Ariane Neethling. ··Defence. Democracy and South Afi"ica's 
Civil-Military Gap." Scienlia Militaria South Ali'ican Journal ojMililaiT Studies 33 (2005): 132. 











However, in this the SANDF has arguably been at its most adaptable, in its adapting to 
new political circumstances during the transition. Problematically though, needs arising 
from PSOs are necessitating the revaluing of adaptability given the nature of the task. 
As such, instead of a loss of value of adaptability, there is rather a lack of willingness to 
adapt with regards to COIN and COIN-related tasks, and largely so given domestic and 
regional attitudes towards the SA military. 
Therefore, how well adaptability survived the transition is unclear. On one level it has 
seemingly been replaced, on the other it has survived too well. The military initially 
adapted to new political circumstances and has since become either entrenched or 
unwilling to adapt further in terms of COIN. Either way, at the core seems to be the 
SANDF's determination not to be seen as the juggernaut that it was during Apartheid. 
3.2.3. Conclusion 
There has been a discontinuation with COIN within the SANDF. While there remain 
specialists which continue to practice COIN, wider training is virtually nil. Practice has 
continued to inform theory, and as such, there is no current COIN theory. Despite a 
lack of resources and an increasing involvement in PSOs, there is a reluctance to refer 
to COIN, and largely due to negative experiences in the wake of the transition. 
Specifically, unpopular internal policing operations and the widely criticized Operation 
Boleas. Moreover, while the military exhibited a willingness to adapt to democracy, it is 
seemingly now unwilling to adapt to the ways and means for which it was condemned 
in the past, regardless of how unpragmatic this may be given its new tasks. 
3.3. CONCLUSION 
At first glance, the SANDF is in an enviable position in terms of COIN. It is a military 
comprised of former counterinsurgents, conventional soldiers and insurgents, all of 
whom could contribute to conceptualizing insurgency and COIN in a dynamic and 
integrated way, making the SANDF uniquely knowledgeable and skilled to combat 
insurgency. However, there has been no fusion of knowledge. Rather there has been a 
veritable fission within the SANDF with COIN. 
The political environment was defined by the transition, an environment intolerant of 
COIN. Through the negotiations a new military was created: statutory and non-statutory 
forces were integrated; and changes were made to the military's posture, function and 
force design. In light of abuses committed by the SADF during Apartheid, the SANDF 











the strategic environment in which South Africa now finds itself, and neither for the role 
that the military is now playing in regional security. It is considered to be in South 
Africa's security interests to ensure peace and stability in the region, and the SANDF a 
key functionary in realizing this through participating in PSOs. These operations are 
increasingly set in insurgent conflicts, and have given rise to the need for COIN skills 
and capabilities. However, the political environment has yet to prove conducive to 
maintaining COIN knowledge. 
Overall, the SANDF has been relatively pragmatic, however, not in relation to COIN. 
Theory has been shelved. Formative experiences in domestic deployments and an 
intervention-styled PSO in Lesotho were unpopular and considered negative by the 
SANDF. However, these experiences determined the kinds of operations in which the 
military is willing to engage. The SANDF does not want to be involved in internal 
deployments, and is not interested in COIN as a task,318 albeit directly or as part of 
PSOs in insurgent conflicts. While several specialist structures survived the transition, 
the commando system, is being phased out, as are internal deployments in support of 
the police. Moreover, while the military may not have lost its value of adaptability, it 
appears to have lost its willingness to adapt to new conditions in light of past 
condemnations regarding its use of COIN warfare. 
Therefore, the SA military has kept its COIN knowledge to a limited extent through 
remaining specialists. However, wider training is insignificant. Whether this will alter in 
any way given the changing political environment from one focused on transition to one 
ever more focused on meeting security interests and conducting PSOs, is uncertain. 
However, given the SANDF's strategic objectives, recognized security threats, ever 
pressing resource and skills-based needs, as well as calls from within for greater 
flexibility, it is unclear as to how long this status quo can and will remain. 











CHAPTER FOUR: COMMENT & PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter will consider the learning and continuing of COIN, and the SA military in 
perspective. Specifically, it will begin by considering the importance of continuing COIN 
in terms of PSOs. This will be followed by a more in-depth analysis of the case of the 
SA military and its reluctance towards future COIN. 
4.1. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING COIN: PSOS 
British General Sir Michael Rose stated that" ... 'If you want to be a good peacekeeper, 
first be a good war fighter,'". ,,319 However, while conventional training provides basic 
war-fighting skills and promotes professionalism, technical expertise, and non-
partisanship, the demands of PSO environments in insurgent conflicts are such that a 
modern military must simultaneously exhibit the flexibility of an unconventional COIN 
force. Conventional war-fighting skills may indeed be the fundamentals for any soldier. 
However, to operate in an insurgency, a soldier needs COIN war-fighting skills. In this, 
a military is best prepared for contemporary conflict, from fighting insurgents in Iraq to 
enforcing peace in the ORC. As such, this author would refine General Rose's 
statement to: if you want to be a good peace soldier, first be a good COIN war fighter. 
Beyond insurgency being the most predominant form of warfare used in the 
contemporary world, COIN knowledge is useful to keep as it is transferable and can be 
applied in other contexts, namely PSOs. 
PSOs in insurgent conflicts are most certainly not COIN operations. However, the 
various tactics and techniques required are essentially the same. Whereas COIN is an 
offensive method of war-fighting; PSOs aim to contain and stabilize conflict, enable and 
restore peace. However, tactically they are the same.320 Albeit manning roadblocks or 
applying force with surgical delicacy to secure an area in which combatants are 
indistinguishable from civilians - if a military can do these as part of COIN, it has the 
necessary skills to conduct PSOs, from observing elections to forcibly securing 
territory. Patterns of conducting COIN even replicate themselves in PSOs. For 
example, British forces tend to take on a policing role and employ minimum force 321 In 
319 As quoted in Tony Clayton. "African Military Capabilities in Insurrection. Intervention and Peace 
Support Operations." in Afi'ican Interventionist States, (eds.) Oliver Furley and Roy May (England: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 200 1).59. 
320 Strawbridge. c;nversation with author, Pretoria. 30 August 2005: Boshoff. interview by author. 
Pretoria. 30 August 2005: See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. General 
Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, chapter I. 
,21 For exa~ple. in Sierra Leone, force used was highly targeted. carefully applied. and employed low-
firepower individual weapons so as to limit civilian casualties. Rod Thornton. "The British Army and the 











contrast, US forces tend to employ maximum force indiscriminately.322 Consequently, 
those militaries that have faired well in learning COIN are well suited to conducting 
PSOs in insurgent conflicts. 323 
Contemporary insurgency will continue to trigger PSOs, as in Sierra Leone and the 
ORC. These PSOs are likewise increasingly being assigned mandates under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, allowing for peace enforcement. Peace enforcement operations 
are those most akin to COIN. While peacekeeping missions under Chapter VI are 
considered increasingly unlikely to occur,324 peace soldiers are being required to 
perform a wide range of COIN-like functions to meet the requirements of Chapter VII 
mandates: to observe elections; man roadblocks; conduct rural and urban patrols; 
forcibly secure territory; and engage in combat with militias. Failure to provide for which 
in terms of skills and training will result in mission failure. 325 
Importantly, PSO training is no substitute for COIN training. While COIN knowledge 
may be transferable and able to be applied in different contexts, PSO training, however 
close to COIN but without a COIN background, is COIN out of context. It fails to foster 
and entrench the same institutional features and is not transferable to a direct 
encounter with insurgency. Instead, like any art, one must first master the basics before 
applying what you have learned in new ways. As such, despite basic COIN-type skills 
being able to be learned under the guise of PSO training, it remains important to train 
in COIN in its own right. 
4.2. THE SA MILITARY & COIN 
Participation in PSOs in insurgent conflicts is necessitating a revival of COIN by virtue 
of the nature of the task and the emerging operational needs within the SANOF. 
Nevertheless, the SANOF remains entrenched in its anti-COIN position. As such, there 
exists a disjuncture between this position and the needs of the African battle space, 
what the army is doing to meet these needs in terms of training, the military's strategic 
objectives, and the country's security policy goals. 
4.2.1. Pragmatism & PSOs 
COIN is an essential war-fighting skill in contemporary conflict and forms the basis of 
PSO training. While present experiences are not identical to those of the past, they are 
322 For example in Somalia. Ibid., 84. 
323 Nagl, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning 
During the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War," 196-197. 
324 Brigadier Vere Hayes, Occasional Paper: Establishing the Credibility of a Regional Peacekeeping 
Capability (South Africa: ACCORD, 2000), 2 and 4. 











neither radically different. In the past, the military countered multiple insurgent groups, 
in urban and rural areas, where combatants were indistinguishable from civilians, in 
various geographical terrains. In PSOs in insurgent conflicts, the SANDF face multiple 
insurgent groups, in urban and rural areas, where combatants are indistinguishable 
from civilians, in a variety of geographical areas. The army has, however, decided that 
conventional war-fighting should be the basis of force preparation, and will enable the 
army" ... to defend itself during peace missions and perform peace enforcement. .. ,,326 
Being that the army no longer widely trains in COIN, and has been criticised by the UN 
for lacking necessary knowledge in its current PSOS,327 it is questionable as to whether 
the army is learning the appropriate skills for the conflicts in which it is being deployed. 
As it stands, troops are given as little as six weeks training prior to deployment in 
peace techniques. It is considered that otherwise conventionally trained soldiers 
require only these six weeks to get their heads round PSOs, and then are adequately 
prepared to be deployed in the likes of the DRC. 328 The SANDF, moreover, has not yet 
engaged in peace enforcement. The White Paper, the Defence Review and the Military 
Strategy all provide for peace enforcement, and both deployments in the DRC and 
Burundi are under peace enforcement mandates, yet the army trains largely only for 
peacekeeping.329 In turn, the military is prepared to meet only mild challenges where 
there is a peace to keep, to man checkpoints, carry out patrols, and use minimum 
force. 33o The army is likewise used only in peacekeeping activities despite being 
deployed under enforcement mandates. For example, in the DRC, where it is deployed 
in the Kivu region, the hottest zone of the conflict.331 The position of the SANDF is that 
it does not train for peace enforcement to any great extent. It will do so only when the 
326 Col E.F. Drost and Capt E. Jordaan, "The SA Army Vision 2020," SA Soldier (June 200S): 39. 
321 Henri Boshoff, telephonic interview by author, Cape Town/Pretoria, 12 December 200S; See Erika 
Gibson, "Dissipline in SA mag kwel VN," Beeld, 8 November 200S, p. 10. 
328 Lusse, telephonic interview by author, Cape Town/Pretoria, 12 September 200S. 
329 Peacekeeping includes monitoring and assisting in the implementation of agreements, with the consent 
of the beIligerent parties, without the use of force, as per Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Peace 
enforcement includes activities outlined by Chapter VII, involves the use offorce to maintain or restore 
peace where peace is threatened, a breach of peace or act of aggression takes place. DOD, South African 
National Defence Force Military Strategy, 6; As per MONUC and ONUB, United Nations Security 
Council, Resolution 1635 SIRESI1635 (2005) (United Nations, 28 October 200S), 
http://daccessdds. un.org/ docIUNDOC/GEN/NOS/S77 /42/PD F /NOS S77 42.pdf?OpenElement; United 
Nations Security Council, Resolution 1650 SIRESI1650 (2005) (United Nations, 21 December 200S), 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GENINOS/6S8/48/PDFINOS6S848.pdf?OpenElement. The SANDF 
has approximately 3000 soldiers deployed at present, including in UN and AU operations in 
Eritrea/Ethiopia, Liberia, Uganda, Sudan and Cote D'Ivoire. Charles Nqakula, Minister for Safety and 
Security, Justice, Crime Prevention & Security Cluster Media Briefing, S May 200S, 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/200S/0S0S0S1S4S1001.htm; DOD, Annual Report 200412005, 34. 
330 Neethling, interview by author, Saldanha, 27 July 200S; Mark Malan, William Nhara and Pol 
Bergevin, "Appendix G: Training for Peace Operations As Conducted in South Africa," in Monograph 
No. 17 African Capabilities for Training For Peace Operations (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 
November 1997), http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/MonographsIN017/AppG.html. 












need arises, and when they do, old COIN training manuals are indeed used.332 In this, 
it would appear that the reluctance towards COIN has carried over to peace 
enforcement. 
While the SANDF is not used in peace enforcement actions in the DRC, other MONUC 
forces are conducting joint operations against warlords in the east of the country, 
operations which are" ... more akin to rural counterinsurgency operations than 
peacekeeping.,,333 In such peace enforcement operations the required skills, tactics, 
equipment, resources, and training are the same as those required for COIN war-
fighting. The capabilities required by forces are the same as those faced by any forces 
taking on an insurgency. In turn, Malan has argued that the former SADF COIN 
manuals may indeed be better suited for the likes of the DRC.334 
The SANDF considers its task to be that of an external peace force in Africa. However, 
the SANDF only participates in classic peacekeeping functions in PSOs, and despite a 
severe lack of resources, relies on conventional war-fighting skills to prepare troops for 
deployment. Problematically, SANDF's reluctance towards COIN has carried over to 
peace enforcement operations, further hindering training and preparation for the 
operational environment in which the SANDF is being deployed. 
4.2.2. Politics & Pragmatism: Fear of the Juggernaut 
Upon integration, the SANDF was poised to become a thoroughly unique military force. 
One comprised of former insurgents and counterinsurgents, and during a time which 
was ideal for an integration of knowledge. Such a fusion of the creative approaches of 
insurgents and COIN soldiers presented the opportunity to draw on the best of what all 
had to offer and enhance methods and tactics within insurgent environments. However, 
instead the military turned away from COIN within a political environment hostile to 
both past COIN and COIN as a method of warfare to be used by the military. 
The SANDF no longer conducts COIN, and much to their credit members hope that 
they will never have to practice COIN internally ever again. 335 However, while 
undoubtedly illegitimate, the SADF's COIN experience was rich and diverse, as was 
MK's insurgent experience. Together these experiences of both sides of the same kind 
of warfare present a unique, multi-faceted resource which can be used to meet current 
332 de Waal, telephone conversation with author, Cape Town/Pretoria, 9 December 2005; Lieutenant 
Colonel P.H.J. de Waal, telephone conversation with author, Cape Town/Pretoria, 16 January 2006. 
333 Malan, "Intelligence in African Peace Operations: Addressing the Deficit," 23. 
334 Mark Malan, email correspondence with author, Cape Town/Accra, 16 August 2005. 











military objectives. However, this has failed to take place due to the unfavourable 
political environment. The military's natural, historical pragmatism towards COIN has 
become intimately linked to this environment. It refuses to be in a position in which it 
will be labelled as imitating past actions, and appears to prefer being criticised for 
failing to meet tasks which require COIN skills. The SANDF will continue to turn from 
COIN as long as the political climate persists. Unfortunately, this misappropriated 
pragmatism is hamstringing the military in its ability to fulfil its tasks. 
Political disfavour is rooted in the overwhelming illegitimacy of the military's COIN wars. 
It informs a deep-set suspicion and fear of the military becoming the juggernaut of the 
past. Unlike other COIN forces associated with abuses in foreign far-flung places, 
many of the military's abuses were committed internally. The military was unable to 
merely withdraw, sail away, and the nation forget the encounter. The experience thus 
continues to define wider opinion of COIN, and the activities and training the SANDF 
conducts. Problematically, the military's tasks and objectives, and the country's security 
policy require the opposite. Instead, there exists a gap between what the SANDF is 
trained for, what is considered acceptable for the SANDF to do, and what the SANDF 
is being expected to achieve in terms of pOlicy.336 Rather, there needs to be a 
reconciliation of sorts within the political environment regarding the security challenges 
faced by the nation, the tasks that must be carried out to meet those challenges, and 
the training which is needed to carry out those tasks effectively. 
This is most pertinent in terms of PSOs. The SANDF is charged with aiding in creating 
security and stability in the region. Proposed missions under the ASF cater for 
operations in conflict scenarios involving warlords, scenarios which are understood to 
require Chapter VII mandates.337 Given the SANDF's future role in SADCBRIG and 
these conflict environments which need stabilizing, military force will most likely have to 
be used to enforce peace. 338 However, the SANDF is not trained in the skills by which 
to fulfil this task, and the use of force to merely keep peace persists in featuring 
prominently on the operational agenda.339 The DOD's position is that the army has 
embraced a learn by doing ethic to develop PSO skills on the ground using experience 
336 Heinecken, GueJi and NeethJing, "Defence, Democracy and South Africa's Civil-Military Gap," 134-
137. 
337 African Union, African Standby Force (ASF): Concept Paper. Part 11: Annexes (African Union: Addis 
Ababa, April 2003), IA-4 and lA-5, 
http://www.iss.org.za/AF /RegOrg/unity to union/pdfs/au/ ASF AnnexApr03 .pdf. 
338 Kent and Malan, "Decisions, Decisions. South Africa's Foray into Regional Peace Operations," 13. 
339 Esterhuyse, "Management and Command in the SANDF: Changing Priorities," 40; Esterhuyse, "Ten 












acquired so far. 340 However, the SANDF has already been criticized by UN officials for 
using PSOs as training missions. 341 
Adaptation regarding COIN occurs only when institutional leaders agree that it is in the 
long term interests for that institution to do SO.342 However, while Nagl has argued in 
relation to a military effecting change to be able to learn COIN where it otherwise has 
been unable to do so, leaders within the SANDF do not have to choose to embrace 
something with which it has previously failed. Instead, leaders need to choose to 
maintain something with which they previously had deadly success. This success is 
held in moral contempt by society, and whether out of moral shame or corporate savvy, 
the military has buried its COIN past. There exists a the past is the past and that's just 
not we do anymore attitude within the DOD. As such it is how DOD leaders remember 
the past, perceive and approach their new mission and role that will determine whether 
they decide to prepare to meet this insurgent challenge. 343 
Thus, a hostile political environment towards COIN is proving problematic for meeting 
PSO commitments and security challenges. There is simply no role for a SANDF in 
Africa which is unable to engage with insurgents and forcibly secure an area. If the 
SANDF is deployed as part of a UN or AU peace enforcement mission, it needs to 
have the capacity to be so deployed. Importantly, using COIN will not legitimate 
Apartheid's COIN campaign. The military has an unredeemable past, however, this 
need not necessitate an incompetent future. While trying to escape the past, it has 
stumbled into the present unprepared for the context and role in which it now finds 
itself. If the SANDF is to perform effectively in PSOs, the military to meet its objectives 
and the nation its policy goals, the SANDF has to be willing to adapt appropriately with 
COIN, and to feel that is sanctioned to do so. Instead of considering COIN as 
untouchable, it needs to be looked upon as something which South Africa can and 
must use. If not, any deployments in insurgent conflicts will be disastrous. 
4.2.3. COIN Past, Present & Future 
Despite the illegitimacy of the SA military's COIN experience, Rocky Williams argued 
that the SANDF ought to maintain" ... a deterrence capability predicated on a mixture of 
conventional and non-conventional capabilities with a greater reliance on the guerrilla 
340 Lusse, telephonic interview by author, Cape Town/Pretoria, 12 September 2005; Lekota, Budget Vote 
bIt Minister of Defence (2004), http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04060909l51001.htm 
3 I Boshoff, telephonic interview by author, Cape Town/Pretoria, 12 December 2005; Gibson, "Dissipline 
in SA mag kwel VN," p. 10. 
342 Nagl, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning 
During the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War," 195 and 197. 











traditions that all South Africans have used with great efficacy throughout the country's 
history.,,344 Given the resources available, the external role envisioned for the military, 
and the strategic environment, this would be a most pragmatic course of action by 
which to meet the SANDF's strategic objectives and to successfully conduct its 
missions. COIN training would aid in preparing the army for all matter of conflict, 
geographic and cultural environments, fostering flexibility and adaptability, and to be 
effective when deployed over vast distances with few resources. 
It is within the military strategy that missions to defend the nation include meeting 
unconventional and non-conventional threats, involving guerrillas, paramilitaries and 
warlords. Thus, to defend the territorial sovereignty of the nation and to the enhance 
the capabilities to do so, war-fighting skills need to include COIN war-fighting skills. The 
army must be able to escalate and de-escalate its actions according to changing 
conditions within an insurgent environment. COIN training ensures the ability to 
escalate and deescalate actions appropriately so as to successfully meet a guerrilla, 
warlord or paramilitary challenge. 
Having a greater COIN capability will likewise have a positive effect on the SANDF's 
capacity to meet its other objectives more successfully. There exists no direct insurgent 
threat to South Africa, however, the SANDF will continue to contend with insurgency 
when deployed in PSOs. Deployments in far away places with little resources in an 
insurgent conflict, requires certain features and skills within a military if it is to be 
effective. Leading members within the SANDF cite the need for such features and 
capacities in order to meet the strategic environment that is the African battle space. 345 
However, these features and capacities are only fostered through COIN training, 
creating a military imbued with adaptability and flexibility, better leadership skills at 
lower levels of responsibility, and greater efficiency in a variety of tasks, from war 
fighting to peacekeeping, from engaging in combat in insurgent conflicts to enforCing 
peace in those same conflicts. 
To meet the needs of PSOs, the SANDF's force designed around purely conventional 
equipment; operations close to one's borders; and relative proximity of support 
structures; needs to be expanded to include that required by protracted deployments 
over vast distances; long range logistiC support; flexibility in different geographic 
environments; high mobility, air and sea transportability; and a greater reliance on light 
344 Williams, "How Primary is the Primary Function? Configuring the SANDF for Africana Realities," 
http://www.iss.org.zalPubs/ ASRl8N o6/HowPrimary.html. 











infantry contingents supported by special forces. 346 These needs and the few resources 
by which they must be completed, would likewise be met through COIN orientated 
training and capabilities. 347 
Developing COIN from the past will best prepare the SANDF for both its current and 
future deployments, whether in defence of the nation, PSOs or in support of the police. 
This will not entail a reversal of conventionalism but rather broaden war-fighting skills 
and capabilities within the SANDF to meet its objectives and the needs of its missions. 
Future COIN tasks by the SANDF are unavoidable, as are the alterations required to 
meet these tasks. Keeping COIN is thus undeniably in the best long-term interests of 
the SA military. 
4.2.4. Conclusion 
Increasing participation in PSOs in insurgent conflicts is creating a need to resurrect 
COIN knowledge. However, the SANDF remains steadfast in its anti-COIN stance. This 
position is intrinsically connected to an unfavourable political environment. An 
environment defined by a deep and widely held suspicion of the military and COIN as a 
result of the military's abusive COIN past. This anti-COIN sentiment both within and 
without the military is increasingly out of step with nation's security policy goals and the 
means necessary to achieve them. However, given these goals and the military's 
tasks, strategic objectives and available resources, COIN is seemingly unavoidable. 
4.3. CONCLUSION 
COIN is a transferable skill, most notably with respect to PSOs in insurgent conflicts. 
While different entities altogether, such PSOs require the same tactics and techniques 
as COIN. However, PSO training is not a substitute for COIN training, and COIN should 
be continued in its own right. More importantly, given the prevalency of insurgency and 
the nature of contemporary conflict environments, albeit direct COIN encounters or 
PSOs, conventional war-fighting skills are insufficient as preparation for deployment 
346 See Major General L. N. Le Roux, "A Determination of the South African Defence Requirements: A 
Vision for 2015 and Beyond," paper presented at the Africa Defence 2000 Summit, Gallagher Estate, 
Midrand, South Africa, 14 August 2000, 
http://www.mil.zalArticles&Papers/Papers/adetern1inationofsouthafrican.htm; Rocky Williams, 
"Defence in a Democracy: The South African Defence Review and the Redefinition ofthe Parameters of 
the National Defence Debate," in Ourselves to Know. Civil-Military Relations and Defence 
Transformation in Southern Africa, (eds.) Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra and Diane Abrahams (South 
Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 219. 
347 Importantly, this incorporation would neither overturn existing structures. There remains a large 
degree of flexibility in the current force design, and with some existing compatibility, the military need 
only adapt its use of existing resources. Institute for Security Studies, Submission on the South African 











into these environments. In order to be effective, militaries need COIN war-fighting 
skills. 
Problematically, the SA military, as an institution, is not recognizing the connection 
between PSOs and COIN. A need for wider COIN training has arisen in the SANDF's 
participation in PSOs in insurgent conflicts. Given the mandates under which it is and 
will be deployed, current PSO training is grossly insufficient. If the military is to be at all 
effective in these operations, it will have to include peace enforcement training and 
practice. However, the SANDF has distanced itself from peace enforcement activities 
given their resemblance to COIN. In order to fulfil its role in bringing greater peace and 
stability to Africa, fulfil wider security policy goals, and be effective in its tasks, the 
SANDF needs to reactivate COIN. 
However, the military's involvement in COIN in the past, the subsequent condemnation 
thereof, and the need for the military to be seen as a benign force within society, 
resulted in an unwillingness to conduct COIN within the military. Such was the impact 
of the transition on the military, that a method of warfare so dominant in its institutional 
experience was set on a path to be forgotten. This position is intimately linked with the 
political environment, which thus so far persisted in being anti-COIN. Despite an 
increasing emphasis placed on PSOs within security policy and the wider security 
context, it is unlikely that the SANDF will incorporate greater COIN as long as the 
political environment continues to sanction against it. In turn, there needs to be a 
reconciling of the past with the needs of the present within the political environment, so 
as to enable the military to approach and conduct its tasks effectively. 
However, ultimately, whether the military continues COIN will only be decided by the 
institution's leaders. This decision is as crucial for the continuation of COIN in a military 
with an illegitimate history with COIN, as is the decision to learn COIN when a military 
has no previous COIN history. 
Yet, COIN tasks cannot be avoided, and neither can the skills and capabilities required 
to carry out these tasks. Albeit defending the nation or PSOs, the nature of the 
military's strategic objectives and the missions associated with them, necessitate 
certain skills and capabilities - skills and capabilities which are acquired through COIN 
training. Importantly, these objectives and missions are determined by the strategic 
environment. They cannot be ignored or sidestepped. Therefore, instead of trying to 











pragmatism with regards to fulfilling the respective task given the available resources 












Learning and keeping COIN knowledge is like learning to eat soup with a knife: it is 
messy, difficult, and particular. 348 Not all militaries are able to learn COIN. Those that 
are, are few in number. COIN knowledge cannot be learned merely from books, but 
relies on very specific circumstances, circumstances which are now perhaps lost to a 
previous age. Those few that have been able to learn need to keep that knowledge. 
However, keeping COIN can prove problematic when its previous use was associated 
with abuse. As in the South African case, this can cause a military to discontinue COIN, 
and to do so regardless of its operational needs. 
(i) Learning & Keeping COIN 
Insurgency is a type of unconventional warfare which uses irregular methods and 
tactics. The fight is characterized by rural action, urban uprising and rebellion, to 
overthrow a government in what becomes a guerrilla war. Traditionally this amounts to 
an asymmetric conflict against a superior military force. Importantly, insurgency has 
endured as a method of warfare from the earliest times, and remains prominent in 
weak and failed state systems in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
COIN is the method of warfare used to put down insurgency. However, learning COIN 
successfully is not straightforward. It is dependent on a conducive political environment 
to learning COIN and pragmatism within a military. Such a political environment is one 
in which there is a crisis of legitimacy in a colonial or minority-rule context, and 
pragmatism is a military's preference to rely on practice rather than theory. 
While there is a place for theory or doctrine in COIN, theory must be applied 
discerningly according to the specific circumstances of the specific conflict. Importantly, 
there is no definitive how-to COIN theory, and a sure sign of failure is when a military 
attempts to apply a set theory in a COIN campaign. Instead, practitioners must take 
what they know from theory and adapt both it and themselves to the given situation. A 
reliance on practice is further rooted in: (i) formative experiences against insurgency; 
(ii) decentralized structures in which there is an emphasis on flexibility; (iii) access to 
few material and human resources necessitating innovativeness and the use of local 
peoples; and (iv) a culture which values adaptability. Central to learning COIN is, 
therefore, a military's ability to use what it has learned and experienced in the past -
including its mistakes - and given the availability of resources, through a decentralized 
structure, apply itself to a particular situation. 











COIN knowledge is best conserved in theory or doctrine, training programmes, and 
elites who specialize in COIN. However, not all militaries are able to learn COIN. Those 
who have, need to keep it at all costs. Not only is it important to know given that 
insurgency is the most prominent form of conflict in the world today, but once learned, 
this knowledge can be kept and applied to different scenarios and types of insurgency 
in different settings and for different purposes. COIN knowledge is not merely about 
tactics, but is simultaneously about the features which it fosters within a military: 
adaptability, flexibility and innovativeness. These are essential to be able to defeat any 
type of insurgency in any type of context, albeit a direct insurgency or a PSO in an 
insurgent conflict. As such, if a military is going to be a good and effective peace force, 
it must first be a good and effective COIN war force. 
(ii) The SA military & COIN 
Having successfully learned COl N during the 1970s and 1980s, keeping COl N post 
1990 has proven as messy as learning it in the first place. The shadow of the 
juggernaut that was the SADF continues to hinder the new SANDF. 
During the years of the COIN wars, there existed a suitable political environment in 
which the army was able to learn COIN. A crisis of legitimacy emerged from the 1960s 
in simultaneous, multiple insurgencies against the white minority-ruled state. This crisis 
came to be seen as a total onslaught by the state, and the army the leading means by 
which to suppress it. The onslaught came from within and beyond the borders of South 
Africa, and was led primarily by the ANC in South Africa, and SWAPO in Namibia. 
While the latter was a more rural guerrilla struggle, the internal insurgency exhibited a 
combination of rural guerrilla action and urban uprising. Both the insurgencies and 
SADF COIN actions spilled over into neighbouring states, particularly Angola, 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique. 
The SADF was pragmatic in its approach. While developing and revising theory, it was 
largely discounted or at best applied selectively given local circumstances. Practice 
was considered more important, and was determined by formative COIN experiences 
especially in Namibia. There was an emphasis on COIN within the army in terms of 
training, and most significant were the decentralized units which specialized in COIN. 
The SADF likewise made do with few human resources, which resulted in the army 
embracing the imperial COIN approach. It established indigenous forces, recruited 
displaced COIN specialists, and used proxy forces to fight and create insurgency to 
eliminate their insurgent enemies. Rooted in the irregular commando and British 











However, the political environment of the transition was not one favourable for the 
keeping of this knowledge. The military was condemned for its COIN wars and the 
abuses it committed as part of those wars. The negotiations and policies decided upon 
during the transition saw the military taking on a staunchly conventional posture and a 
retracting attitude towards COIN as it aimed to be seen as a benign, professional force. 
However, while well-intentioned at the time, this stance is proving increasingly out of 
step with the new strategic and operational environment in which the army now finds 
itself. Problematically, new security threats and the need to bring peace and stability to 
the region has resulted in the SANDF becoming increasingly involved in PSOs in 
insurgent conflicts. The SANDF's strategic objectives further include the defence of the 
nation against any external threats of aggression and the promotion of peace, security 
and stability in Africa. These require the SANDF to be able to engage in missions to 
counter guerrillas, warlords and paramilitaries, as well as in peace enforcement 
operations. However, the SANDF no longer practices COIN to a significant degree. 
There exists no COIN theory, wider training is negligible, and while a number of 
specialist structures continue to train in COIN, others are being eliminated. 
Despite an apparent change in the political environment to one more pro-PSO (and 
potentially more pro-COIN), and despite material and human resources being 
desperately few due to limited budgets and the prevalency of HIV/AIDS, the SANDF 
remains reluctant to embrace COIN to meet its needs. In this it is both pragmatic and 
unpragmatic. It pragmatically adapted to democracy, and is now unwilling to dabble in 
COIN again given the hot water in which it has found itself for doing so in the past. 
However, by virtue of the nature of its new tasks, the SANDF is proving decidedly 
unpragmatic in its unwillingness to adapt to its new circumstances and role 
appropriately. As such, the SANDF trains and participates only in classic peacekeeping 
activities in its current PSOs, regardless of criticisms, failings in performance, and the 
peace enforcement mandates under which it is deployed. The SANDF is simply 
unwilling to engage in COIN and COIN-like activities, and has set itself on a path to 
forget its COIN knowledge. Such was the impact of the transition to democracy on the 
SA military. It fundamentally altered the military's perception of COIN, the dominant 
form of warfare in its institutional experience. This alteration has resulted in the SANDF 
being poorly prepared for both its present and future tasks. 
However, only SANDF leaders can make the decision to revive COIN. There may not 
be a direct insurgent threat against the South African state, however, given the tasks of 











deployed, calls for greater flexibility, its role in regional security structures, the need to 
meet wider security goals, and its own strategic objectives and associated missions, it 
is difficult to see how the SANDF can with any reason maintain its anti-COIN stance. 
Only COIN training fosters features like flexibility and innovativeness within the make-
up of a military, and provides the necessary context of understanding for learning COIN 
skills and techniques, skills and techniques required of any military force in an 
insurgent conflict, albeit a peace force or COIN force. 
Pragmatism within the SANDF is being hindered by a disparity within the political 
environment. There is a lingering distrust of the military both within South Africa and 
the region. However, tasks tend to remain the same, regardless of time and transition. 
Whether the SANDF continues COIN is not a question of moral-historical should or 
should not, but an issue of need today. The SANDF needs to train in COIN so as to 
meet its needs in PSOs, to meet its strategic objectives, to meet guerrilla, warlord and 
paramilitary challenges, to be able to fulfil its role in regional security structures, and to 
aid in bringing peace to a region too long torn apart by war. 
Consequently, political and military leaders alike need to reconcile the political 
environment and pragmatism within the military, to decide to do what is necessary to 
attain policy goals and to be effective in military tasks given the resources available. 
Leaders need to decide to continue, develop and revise COIN, and in turn, recognize 
the connection between COIN and the PSOs in which the military is most likely to be 
deployed. 
(iii) Last Word ... 
Learning and keeping COIN is indeed like eating soup with a knife. It is difficult and 
dependent on very particular conditions. Yet with insurgency abounding in every 
direction, in one form or another, and PSOs in insurgent conflicts on the rise, the 
relevance of COIN for contemporary and future conflict is undeniable. If a military has 
been fortunate enough to be able learn COIN in the past when the stars aligned for a 
brief time to provide the very specific circumstances in which to do so, a military must 
make every effort to keep that knowledge. 
Yet the keeping is seemingly more so difficult when, like South Africa, there is a history 
of human rights abuses during the learning, where the learning is done in part 
domestically, and where that learning is widely considered illegitimate. In such a case, 
there can be no withdrawal from some faraway place. The experience cannot be 











around and few can forget the role of the military in that past. However, there is an ever 
pressing need to meet the demands of the present, and for that, the SANDF needs its 
COIN past whether it or anyone else likes it or not. Having been able to learn COIN, to 
have that knowledge and ability, South Africa has a responsibility to use it to bring 
greater peace and stability to the continent. After all, the history of a military is fluid, 
and no past, however bleak, can be neatly placed into a box and shelved. Instead, it 
needs to be integrated into a living body of knowledge of what it has learned and 
experienced, a body which can be drawn on when required, when faced with 
something it has most definitely seen before. Until then, success as a military force 
effective in enhancing defensive capabilities and bringing peace, security and stability 
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Appendix B - DRe Peac;ekeeping (c;ourtesy of Zapiro) 
The complex nature of both the conflict In the DRe. as well as other warlord 
insurgencies is well illuslraled in Zaprro's ORe Peacekeepng-' canoon , 5 May 2000, 
Maii and Guardian Specifically It apt ly highlights both the plethora of Indist inguishable 
participants. and the subsequent difficulties th is kind of conflict poses for peace 
so ldiers 
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